Applying (and Resisting) Peer Influence
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Abstract:
Scholars of various kinds long have documented the great degree to which people are influenced by similar others. Indeed, the opinions, experiences and behaviors of friends, neighbors and coworkers can provide an invaluable gold mine of persuasive resources. But even savvy executives can fail to appreciate the full power of peer influence ? or they might neglect to anticipate its unintended consequences.
Consider, for example, managers who are responsible for shaping or enforcing policy within an organization. They will frequently call attention to a problem behavior, such as supply room theft, by depicting it as regrettably frequent. Although such admonitions might be well-intentioned, the communicators have missed something critically important: Within the lament of Look at all the people who are doing this undesirable thing lurks the powerful and undercutting disclosure Look at all the people who are doing it. And in trying to alert people to the growing occurrence of a problem ? which could be anything from expense account padding to safety violations ? managers can inadvertently make it worse. After the Internal Revenue Service announced that it was going to strengthen the penalties for tax evasion because so many citizens were cheating on their returns, tax fraud actually increased in the following year.
But that's not the only type of mistake that managers regularly make. Indeed, a more subtle problem occurs when they fail to recognize how peer influence is affecting their own decisions. Such situations can be particularly dangerous, leading people to do exactly what they shouldn't, all because they inadvertently have listened to the wrong voices. Thus, when trying to solve a problem, managers should resist the tendency (and the conventional wisdom) to start by casting the widest net possible and then later discounting information that isn't relevant. The potential pitfall of that approach is that it inserts the filtering process too late, after any irrelevant data might have already had a subconscious impact on a person's decision making.Keywords:
Mistake
Unintended consequences
Evasion (ethics)
Suspect
Lament
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IntroductionChange is a regular feature of organizational life and indeed, an inseparable aspect of nature while resistance is itself an inseparable aspect of change. This is primarily because people are uncomfortable with the new, the strange and the unknown and they would rather prefer stability even though progress is never attained by being static. Indeed, Lewin (1947), the grand-father of change management studies, believes that change initiatives always encounter strong resistance, even when there is general agreement the goals of the initiatives; and that organizations are naturally highly resistant to change due to the human nature (behavior, habits, group norms) and organizational inertia. Pryor et al (2008) insist that resistance is a normal reaction to change and should be expected, a view similar to that of Kohles, Baker & Donaho (1995) who aver that transformational organizations should recognize normal resistance and plan strategies to enable people to work through it. But resistance to change (RTC) is a contentious and paradoxical concept. Robinson & Finley (1997) argue that because change outcomes are always disappointing, participants lower their expectations, dig in and stop changing or find better ways to change and no matter which of these three classic responses people make, change always wins?. If we don? t embrace it, overtakes us and hurts like; if we do try to embrace it, still knocks us for a loop and if we try to anticipate and be ready when appears, we still end up our knees. That is why people hate change; is always painful even when self-administered (Robinson & Finley, 1997:1)Marsh (2001) differs a little bit by categorizing the change participants into winners and losers; those who enjoy and those who suffer it, declaring that only people who instigate change enjoy while ot hers have to suffer it. D?Aprix (1996) states that 55% of organizational citizens is against any change while 85% is not ready to wholeheartedly commit their energies to because anytime a major organizational change is announced fifteen percent of the staff are angry; forty percent fearful, skeptical, and distrustful, thirty percent uncertain but open; and only fifteen percent hopeful and energized. In effect, the change programme is DOA(dead arrival). Furthermore, Strebel (1996) and Sopow (2007) insist that managers and staff perceive change differently; the former seeing positively as a desirable way forward( of course, they are the instigators who would enjoy it-Marsh, 2001) while the latter see as avoidable and unnecessary pain. Thus, for top level managers, change is an opportunity to strengthen the business by aligning operations with strategy, to take new professional challenges and risks and to advance their careers but for many employees , change is neither sought after nor welcomed; is disruptive and intrusive. It upsets the balance (Strebel; 1996). Also, while management says that the goal of change is to change the culture; create new and positive mindset that leads to better performance, employees however hear that those things that make them feel safe and provide a sense of predictability are about to disappear. It means messing with tried/tested traditions and ignoring many years of lessons (Sopow, 2007).Most proponents of change also assume that enthusiastic support will be automatic because the objectives are worthwhile and obvious (Brown & Harvey 2006). But the people on the other side? perceive things differently. They are forced to alter how they relate to others, their goals, processes, equipment, and reality and all these lead to anxiety (Marsh, 2001). They also continue with familiar strategies and behaviors, which have been successful in the past but which have now become inappropriate and ineffective and wonder why they no longer work while management is convinced that employees will automatically recognize its worth and to embrace it (Gingerella, 1993). …
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The implications of this article are profound. Physicians should find better ways of working among themselves. But they will remain frustrated so long as their patients cannot find better ways of working, too. It is not just health care organizations that drive people mad. Virtually all workers complain about the excessive sacrifices that their employers demand. Suchman's admirable analysis points to a journey on which physicians are beginning to embark. But where will that journey eventually go?
The generally accepted model of organization today aims to produce predictable outcomes. Most organizations are essentially impersonal, defining themselves by the sum of the functions they perform, rather than by the characters and temperament of the individuals they employ at any particular time. When one person goes, the next one is supposed to do the same work, however different he or she is. For a time, the attainment of impersonality seemed to be a triumph—or was what the West had been striving for during the past 2 centuries in an attempt to get rid of nepotism and favoritism.
But humans are not predictable, and they are becoming less predictable as they have more choices and more education to kindle their curiosity. Our public institutions, on the other hand, have not reconciled themselves to the fact that each person is unique. When they do, the ideal of a personalized approach will become more attractive than the impersonal one, provided it can be shorn of its previous faults.
When physicians do what Suchman and colleagues have done, they are trying to create new kinds of organizations to replace what we have inherited. Doing this on a big scale is not easy, but it is necessary if the small-scale achievements are not to be frustrated by outside financial pressures. The most powerful organizations are ruled by accountants who calculate only certain kinds of profit and exclude all the social and emotional benefits produced by people working together, which cannot be quantified in monetary terms. But do not blame the accountants. Many among them also are worried that their profession is in crisis and that something radical must be done.
Following Suchman's example is, therefore, only part of the solution for the achievement of the well-being he seeks. His patients will still complain about the effects of working in stress-producing organizations. The problem he tackles is part of a more general one, and the next step is to see how physicians can contribute to finding remedies by cooperating with others outside their profession. If each profession remains absorbed in its own affairs, it will not get far. The frustrations of occupational medicine show that a new approach is necessary. Physicians and accountants—and many other occupations—need to get together.1 To expect large professional organizations to take the lead is unrealistic.
Although much can be done on the Internet, those of us who are interested in making work of all kinds less frustrating and damaging need to have face-to-face meetings, preferably in congenial and stimulating surroundings. Our project must be enjoyable as well as fruitful, and it should encourage practical experiments rather than well-meaning rhetoric. I would like to set up a completely new kind of institution for the 21st century, based in Oxford, but with branches internationally, to be the focus of such encounters. I want to invite practitioners in all spheres of human activity to come to it for short visits to distil the lessons of their lives, so that their experience is not wasted and so that the young can learn about opportunities that conventional training obscures. I have been encouraged by members of several professions already and would welcome both intellectual and financial support from the West Coast.
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In an ideal world, a subordinate would accept critical feedback from a manager with an open mind. He or she would ask a few clarifying questions, promise to work on certain performance areas, and show signs of improvement over time. But things don't always turn out that way. Such conversations can be unpleasant. Emotions can run high; tempers can flare. Fearing that the employee will become angry and defensive, the boss all too often inadvertently sabotages the meeting by preparing for it in a way that stifles honest discussion. This unintentional--indeed, unconscious--stress-induced habit makes it difficult to deliver corrective feedback effectively. Insead professor Jean-François Manzoni says that by changing the mind-set with which they develop and deliver negative feedback, managers can increase their odds of having productive conversations without damaging relationships. Manzoni describes two behavioral phenomena that color the feedback process--the fundamental attribution error and the false consensus effect--and uses real-world examples to demonstrate how bosses' critiques can go astray. Managers tend to frame difficult situations and decisions in a way that is narrow (alternatives aren't considered) and binary (there are only two possible outcomes--win or lose). And during the feedback discussion, managers' framing of the issues often remains frozen, regardless of the direction the conversation takes. Manzoni advises managers not to just settle on the first acceptable explanation for a behavior or situation they've witnessed. Bosses also need to consider an employee's circumstances rather than just attributing weak performance to a person's disposition. In short, delivering more effective feedback requires an open-minded approach, one that will convince employees that the process is fair and that the boss is ready for an honest conversation.
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If most members of a group make errors, others may make them simply to avoid seeming disagreeable or foolish. All too often, groups fail to achieve the storied wisdom of crowds. In recent years, behavioral research has begun to identify precisely where they go wrong. But so far this academic work has yet to have a noticeable effect on actual practice. The two main reasons for error are informational signals (some group members receive incorrect signals from other members) and reputational pressures (people silence themselves or change their views to avoid serious penalties). These two factors lead to four separate but interrelated problems: (1) Groups don’t merely fail to correct their members’ errors; they amplify them. (2) They fall victim to cascade effects, following the statements and actions of those who went first. (3) They become polarized, taking even more-extreme positions than originally. (4) They focus on “what everybody knows,” ignoring critical information that only one or two members have. The authors offer some simple suggestions for improvement: Silence the leader, “prime” critical thinking, reward group success, assign roles, appoint a devil’s advocate, establish contrarian teams, and use the Delphi method
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