Study on Distribution of Land Incomes Between Governments by the Game Theory
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With the development of land compensated use system, there comes the contradiction between the central government and the local government, who act as the owners of land incomes. The central government defines the income-distribution relationship between local government and itself by law frequently, but due to the strongly economic driving force, the central government can抰 obtain the part belonging to itself in reality. Therefore, applying the game theory, the paper come to the conclusion that the logical policy tactic to resolve this problem is that the central government should adopt the policy of reducing land income-distribution ratio besides the reinforcement of the financial supervision mechanism, land property right restriction mechanism and land-fund concentration management mechanism and so on; and the local government should adopt the policy of magnifying land income-distribution ratio under the condition of restriction mechanism by the central government.Keywords:
Contradiction
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Western countries witnessed the transformation from an authoritarian government to a government under the rule of law,from the all-government to a service-oriented government.The establishment of the rule of law,combined with the service orientation,enabled Western governments to shift their functions in the land transfer.The lands of collective ownership in rural areas are manipulated by the governments' buying monopoly and selling monopoly,which means that during the land transactions,the government is both the seller and buyer,and farmer is marginalized,only to become the biggest loser.This problem derives from the government's confusion on its function and orientation.Therefore,government should shift its function in rural land expropriation: from promoting income to providing services,and from participating market transactions to performing market supervision.Only in this way can the legitimate rights and interests of farmers be ensured.
Expropriation
Rule of Law
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At present,though China has lawfully regulated rural ownership transfer system,there exist many problems in practice.For example,in the process of conversion,a huge price difference occurred;reckless expansion of interests has led to overbroad scope;apart from that,there is deficiency in compensation mechanism for transfer and difficulty in guaranteeing the legitimate rights of landless peasants.In order to solve this problem,rules and regulations should be established to avoid land finance and self-serving behavior of the government.In addition,the scope of public interest should be made clear to improve the acquisition system.And finally long-term mechanism for compensation for lost of farmers should be established to protect their quality of life.By doing so,the existing rural ownership transfer system could be rectified.
Scope (computer science)
Public ownership
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Under current China's land-policy,the local governments have advantage in information controling and actual operation,so it is difficult for the central government to protect arable land and farmers interest,leading to a virtuous circle of controlling and exploiting land.Therefore,it is necessary to improve current land-related laws and policies to protect the farmers' rights on land,which include setting mechanism to allow the landowners to participate directly in land trading,as well as eliminating the land financial incentives of the local government etc.
Arable land
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In recent years,the amount urban land transfer fee is growing rapidly in China,as a result of imperfect rural land property right,poor financial system and inadequate management of land granting fee.To solve the problems: firstly,rural land should be transformed into join-stock one to make clear farmers' ownership of the collective land,so that the status of farmers as a collectivity can be favored in land transfer negotiation;secondly,house tax should be levied during the house tenure,to relieve the financial pressure of local governments;and thirdly,the government should strengthen the management of urban land transfer to improve the efficiency of urban land transfer fee.
Stock (firearms)
Common ownership
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To increase fiscal revenue and promote the rapid development of local economy and the pursuit of performance,local governments often use their advantage against the central land policy.This makes the land policy of the central government difficult to play its role in the protection of arable land,food security and interests of farmers,thus exacerbates land policy game between the central and local governments.In order to achieve better the interests of both sides of the game,mechanism of incentive compatibility is established through the principal-agent model to realize the profit distribution of the central and local government game.According to the above game analysis results,corresponding advice and measures are given to achieve better national macroeconomic regulation and control policy.
Arable land
Incentive compatibility
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Study on Land Finance Formation Mechanism of Local Government——Basedon Dynamic Multistage Game Model
Land finance is a hot issue in China's local government administration management in recent years,however,the academe has not arrived any consistent conclusion on the formation mechanism. The paper analyses the central government,local governments and developers in land revenue function and strategy selection by multi-stage dynamic game model,reveals the inherent mechanism and evolution process of the formation of local government land finance.The results show that the dependence of the local government on the land finance is related to the financial system and tax structure,and the target of the central government and local governments. In order to relieve the local governments' financial dependence on land,we should adjust and deepen the reform of the tax system,innovate the cadre appraisal system,increase the punishment of illegal land acquisition,strengthen land management.
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Recently,There are many problems and contradictions in the land expropriation process,its roots in the interests of the land use changes could not be equitable distribution among various groups.The local governments to act as the most direct recruitment of the subject in the land acquisition,and in games hold the absolute informations and systems superiority in the process and the result.To use rural-urban land conversion model to analyze the benefit redistribution from farmland to the construction land,then analyzes the local authority to draft the behavior main driving influence.Then propose the rational distribution benefit of the countermeasure:First,regulate the local governments' behaviors in the land expropriation.Secondly,improve the land requisition system.Thirdly,increase participation of farmers whose land was expropriated.
Expropriation
Requisition
Redistribution
Countermeasure
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The purpose of the research is to analyze the reason that why industrial land is sold in a relatively cheap price and is allocated inefficiently regarding the governmental failure at different levels.Method used is the game theory to evaluate and test three viewpoints.The results show that with respect to the solution for a more reasonable land price and a better land use efficiency,neither the hypothesis that different municipalities strengthen their monopolized role in the land market and improve their techniques of supplying land,nor the assumption that central government promote a more strict administrative supervision and management was supported by the model analysis.A prominent finding is that the Price Floor Policy successfully helps to maintain a certain level of land price given by local government in the context of current institutions.The paper concludes that several drawbacks of the fundamental institution of the industrial land market are noticed,which cause the abnormally cheap industrial land price and low land use efficiency.A possible solution is that government should gradually leave land market more freedom and autonomy.Based on a market with a variety of land suppliers,the problems discussed in this research can be potentially solved.
Viewpoints
Institution
Government failure
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The purpose of this paper is to design the game theory model between local government and land-lost peasants,and find out the correlative factors which can make the equilibrium of the game more reasonable.The method of game theory was employed.The results indicate that the reduction of the costs of the land-lost peasants for protecting their property rights,the increase of land-lost peasants’benefit from land acquisition,as well as the enhancement of punishing local governments’illegal land acquisition activities can make the equilibrium of the game between local government and land-lost peasants more reasonable,which effectively restrains the impulsion of illegal land acquisition of local government,reduces the frequency of appealing to up-level government for their property rights by the land-lost peasants,avoids the conflicts caused by land acquisition,as well as promotes the harmonious development of the whole society.
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Being an effective way and an important measure to save land as well as to ease the tension between land supply and land demand,the readjustment of rural construction land occupies a strategic position in the new rural construction and rural-urban comprehensive developments.As a totally new measure,it has no ready-made path or mode to follow.It would possibly lead to the adjustments in the character,the attribution,and the objection of the land ownership,and thus may result in many benefit conflicts.As a new land policy,its flexibility may be easily misinterpreted as a means to expropriate land or even as a land-enclosure movement to rob peasants of land benefits.Given the fact that the relevant law and policy are still not mature,especially that the law mechanism for protecting peasants' land rights is imperfect,it is necessary to fully understand the constraint factors,the law risks,and the policy barriers of the readjustment on rural construction land.It should not depend on the administrative force but should rely on the positive guidance,correct adjustments,and effective regulation of law improvements and policy mechanism innovation,which should be in accordance with the rule of law.
Position (finance)
Severance
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