The Professional Urban Planner
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Abstract Abstract The public image of the planner depicts him as an artist; as the master planner who intuitively prepares the best plans for the community. Planners, through their professional organizations, try to maintain an image of comprehensiveness. Neither image provides an adequate description of the planning profession. Neither explains why the plans prepared by the urban planner fail to gain real social commitment. What urban planners do and why they do it becomes more understandable when they are seen as governmental functionaries. A description of government's role, which is to order and regulate things, becomes a description of the planners' role. A description of the government the planner is subordinated to can serve to define the practical limitations of the plans urban planners prepare.Keywords:
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Social planner
In his article, Charles F. Manski (Manski [2009]) elaborates on a topic that is familiar to economists, namely the normative question concerning which policy a social planner should implement to maximize welfare. Suppose a benevolent planner has a set of available policies 7' of which he can implement a particular policy t. Each policy affects individual outcomes for the members of society. The effectiveness of policies, the treatment response, is therefore characterized by a mapping of policies t e Τ into outcomes y(t) e Y for the different members j of the population (or the society at large), yjs(·): Τ -» Y. The treatment response can, in general, differ across the members of the population, and can also depend on the particular state of the world, s e S. Given a measure of welfare, such as a utilitarian welfare function, the planner can evaluate the effect of a policy on the population at large. Of course, in this canonical model the planner should choose the policy that maximizes social welfare and that implements the first-best allocation under the given environment.
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Abstract Recently, firms like Toyota and social planners like the Government of India have invested in various initiatives leading to the firm's cost reduction. Further, such cost reduction collaborations also benefit the social planner because of higher industry output, and therefore, higher employment opportunities. In this paper, we investigate different scenarios in which the firm, or the social planner, or both exert efforts to reduce the firm's manufacturing cost. Interestingly, we find that under certain conditions, the firm may exert lower effort than the social planner. Our analysis reveals that when both players' cost reduction effectiveness is low, then collaboration results in higher payoffs for both the players. However, when the effectiveness of any player is high, then both players are better off if only one of them exerts effort. Our study further reveals that collaboration between the social planner and the firm always leads to a win–win situation.
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Social cost
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If total social income is fixed and a social planner is uninformed of the utility representations of different individuals, then Lerner showed that the social optimum is to equally distribute income across individuals. We show that the planner by the use of randomization can in some circumstances induce individuals to reveal information about the curvature of their utility functions and then use the information to move away from equality on average. However, whether this is optimal depends in part on unobservable beliefs of the planner. These may be viewed as an aspect of the planner's ethical judgements or as something entirely arbitrary.
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Social planner
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Revelation
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In this paper, I show that, under relatively weak conditions, dynastic equilibria are never welfare optima. If a social planner sets policy to maximize a social welfare function, then, except in extreme cases where the planner cares only about a single generation, successive generations will never be linked through altruistically motivated transfers. This suggests that the dynastic model is unsuitable for normative analysis, and, to the extent governments actually behave in this manner, the model is also inappropriate for positive analysis. In addition, I show that, except in a few special cases, the planner's preferences are dynamically inconsistent. If the planner can successfully resolve this inconsistency, then the central result is somewhat modified.
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In this paper, I show that, under relatively weak conditions, dynastic equilibria are never welfare optima. If a social planner sets policy to maximize a social welfare function, then, except in extreme cases where the planner cares only about a single generation, successive generations will never be linked through altruistically motivated transfers. This suggests that the dynastic model is unsuitable for normative analysis, and, to the extent governments actually behave in this manner, the model is also inappropriate for positive analysis. In addition, I show that, except in a few special cases, the planner's preferences are dynamically inconsistent. If the planner can successfully resolve this inconsistency, then the central result is somewhat modified.
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Social planner
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Social welfare function
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A nurse planner is an integral part of a provider unit. The nurse planner is responsible for the quality of individual educational activities offered by the provider unit as well as overall functioning of the provider unit. Selecting the right individual or individuals to be nurse planner(s) significantly impacts the provider unit's effectiveness.
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This paper adopts the real options approach and hierarchical game to examine how the social planner should change the optimal taxation on the land development under density ceiling control. We assume the reduced ecological value from development influences the choices of social planner and should be internalized into the model by the social planner while the developer ignores it. According to the results, we show that the social planner respectively implement the taxation on land development to alleviate the size of negative environmental externality and an increase of the tax rate on the developed property will decrease the tax rate on the vacant land when the taxations on land development are simultaneously regarded as given by the social planner under density ceiling control.
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Planner
Externality
Ceiling (cloud)
Tax rate
Property tax
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Let there be two individuals: “rich,” and “poor.” Due to inefficiency of the income redistribution policy, if a social planner were to tax the rich in order to transfer to the poor, only a fraction of the taxed income would be given to the poor. Under such inefficiency and a standard utility specification, a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to maximize the utility of the worst-off individual will select a different allocation of incomes than a utilitarian social planner who seeks to maximize the sum of the individuals’ utilities. However, when individuals prefer not only to have more income but also not to have low status conceptualized as low relative income, and when this distaste is incorporated in the individuals’ utility functions with a weight that is greater than a specified critical level, then a utilitarian social planner will select the very same income distribution as a Rawlsian social planner.
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Social planner
Redistribution
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In his article, Charles F. Manski (Manski [2009]) elaborates on a topic that is familiar to economists, namely the normative question concerning which policy a social planner should implement to maximize welfare. Suppose a benevolent planner has a set of available policies 7' of which he can implement a particular policy t. Each policy affects individual outcomes for the members of society. The effectiveness of policies, the treatment response, is therefore characterized by a mapping of policies t e Τ into outcomes y(t) e Y for the different members j of the population (or the society at large), yjs(·): Τ -» Y. The treatment response can, in general, differ across the members of the population, and can also depend on the particular state of the world, s e S. Given a measure of welfare, such as a utilitarian welfare function, the planner can evaluate the effect of a policy on the population at large. Of course, in this canonical model the planner should choose the policy that maximizes social welfare and that implements the first-best allocation under the given environment.
Social planner
Planner
Social welfare function
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