Picking a Planner: More Than Random Selection
0
Citation
1
Reference
10
Related Paper
Abstract:
A nurse planner is an integral part of a provider unit. The nurse planner is responsible for the quality of individual educational activities offered by the provider unit as well as overall functioning of the provider unit. Selecting the right individual or individuals to be nurse planner(s) significantly impacts the provider unit's effectiveness.Keywords:
Planner
Social planner
Non-price competition strategy is a major health policy concern in many countries. This paper studies the treatment specialization choice and quality level competition among hospitals. We extend a two-stage spatial duopoly model, with the partially altruistic providers firstly choosing specialization and then determining quality level when the treatment price is set exogenously by central planner. The first best conclusion of quality is that two hospitals always invest equally much is quality, which suggests the “quality weapon†between hospitals in reality. Then, specialization-quality equilibrium gives the conclusion that quality competition introduces a centrifugal effect in the specialization game. And with the unmatched cost between patients disease and hospital’s specialization is lower, hospitals' equilibrium quality level and specialization differentiation will decrease.
Duopoly
Social planner
Planner
Product Differentiation
Cite
Citations (0)
In his article, Charles F. Manski (Manski [2009]) elaborates on a topic that is familiar to economists, namely the normative question concerning which policy a social planner should implement to maximize welfare. Suppose a benevolent planner has a set of available policies 7' of which he can implement a particular policy t. Each policy affects individual outcomes for the members of society. The effectiveness of policies, the treatment response, is therefore characterized by a mapping of policies t e Τ into outcomes y(t) e Y for the different members j of the population (or the society at large), yjs(·): Τ -» Y. The treatment response can, in general, differ across the members of the population, and can also depend on the particular state of the world, s e S. Given a measure of welfare, such as a utilitarian welfare function, the planner can evaluate the effect of a policy on the population at large. Of course, in this canonical model the planner should choose the policy that maximizes social welfare and that implements the first-best allocation under the given environment.
Social planner
Planner
Social welfare function
Cite
Citations (0)
In this paper, I show that, under relatively weak conditions, dynastic equilibria are never welfare optima. If a social planner sets policy to maximize a social welfare function, then, except in extreme cases where the planner cares only about a single generation, successive generations will never be linked through altruistically motivated transfers. This suggests that the dynastic model is unsuitable for normative analysis, and, to the extent governments actually behave in this manner, the model is also inappropriate for positive analysis. In addition, I show that, except in a few special cases, the planner's preferences are dynamically inconsistent. If the planner can successfully resolve this inconsistency, then the central result is somewhat modified.
Planner
Social planner
Altruism
Social welfare function
Cite
Citations (0)
Non-price competition strategy is a major health policy concern in many countries. This paper studies the treatment specialization choice and quality level competition among hospitals. We extend a two-stage spatial duopoly model, with the partially altruistic providers firstly choosing specialization and then determining quality level when the treatment price is set exogenously by central planner. The first best conclusion of quality is that two hospitals always invest equally much is quality, which suggests the “quality weapon†between hospitals in reality. Then, specialization-quality equilibrium gives the conclusion that quality competition introduces a centrifugal effect in the specialization game. And with the unmatched cost between patients disease and hospital’s specialization is lower, hospitals' equilibrium quality level and specialization differentiation will decrease.
Duopoly
Social planner
Planner
Product Differentiation
Market share
Cite
Citations (0)
A nurse planner is an integral part of a provider unit. The nurse planner is responsible for the quality of individual educational activities offered by the provider unit as well as overall functioning of the provider unit. Selecting the right individual or individuals to be nurse planner(s) significantly impacts the provider unit's effectiveness.
Planner
Social planner
Cite
Citations (0)
This paper adopts the real options approach and hierarchical game to examine how the social planner should change the optimal taxation on the land development under density ceiling control. We assume the reduced ecological value from development influences the choices of social planner and should be internalized into the model by the social planner while the developer ignores it. According to the results, we show that the social planner respectively implement the taxation on land development to alleviate the size of negative environmental externality and an increase of the tax rate on the developed property will decrease the tax rate on the vacant land when the taxations on land development are simultaneously regarded as given by the social planner under density ceiling control.
Social planner
Planner
Externality
Ceiling (cloud)
Tax rate
Property tax
Cite
Citations (0)
Non-price competition strategy is a major health policy concern in many countries. This paper studies the treatment specialization choice and quality level competition among hospitals. We extend a two-stage spatial duopoly model, with the partially altruistic providers firstly choosing specialization and then determining quality level when the treatment price is set exogenously by central planner. The first best conclusion of quality is that two hospitals always invest equally much is quality, which suggests the “quality weapon” between hospitals in reality. Then, specialization-quality equilibrium gives the conclusion that quality competition introduces a centrifugal effect in the specialization game. And with the unmatched cost between patients disease and hospital’s specialization is lower, hospitals' equilibrium quality level and specialization differentiation will decrease.
Duopoly
Social planner
Planner
Product Differentiation
Cite
Citations (2)
Social planner
Planner
Theory of computation
Cite
Citations (3)
Бұл зерттеужұмысындaКaно моделітурaлы жәнеоғaн қaтыстытолықмәліметберілгенжәнеуниверситетстуденттерінебaғыттaлғaн қолдaнбaлы (кейстік)зерттеужүргізілген.АхметЯссaуи университетініңстуденттеріүшін Кaно моделіқолдaнылғaн, олaрдың жоғaры білімберусaпaсынa қоятынмaңыздытaлaптaры, яғнисaпaлық қaжеттіліктері,олaрдың мaңыздылығытурaлы жәнесaпaлық қaжеттіліктерінеқaтыстыөз университетінқaлaй бaғaлaйтындығытурaлы сұрaқтaр қойылғaн. Осы зерттеудіңмaқсaты АхметЯсaуи университетіндетуризмменеджментіжәнеқaржы бaкaлaвриaт бaғдaрлaмaлaрыныңсaпaсынa қaтыстыстуденттердіңқaжеттіліктерінaнықтaу, студенттердіңқaнaғaттaну, қaнaғaттaнбaу дәрежелерінбелгілеу,білімберусaпaсын aнықтaу мен жетілдіружолдaрын тaлдaу болыптaбылaды. Осы мaқсaтқaжетуүшін, ең aлдыменКaно сaуaлнaмaсы түзіліп,116 студенткеқолдaнылдыжәнебілімберугежәнеоның сaпaсынa қaтыстыстуденттердіңтaлaптaры мен қaжеттіліктерітоптықжұмыстaрaрқылыaнықтaлды. Екіншіден,бұл aнықтaлғaн тaлaптaр мен қaжеттіліктерКaно бaғaлaу кестесіменжіктелді.Осылaйшa, сaпa тaлaптaры төрт сaнaтқa бөлінді:болуытиіс, бір өлшемді,тaртымдыжәнебейтaрaп.Соңындa,қaнaғaттaну мен қaнaғaттaнбaудың мәндеріесептелдіжәнестуденттердіңқaнaғaттaну мен қaнaғaттaнбaу деңгейлерінжоғaрылaту мен төмендетудеосытaлaптaр мен қaжеттіліктердіңрөліaйқын aнықтaлды.Түйінсөздер:сaпa, сaпaлық қaжеттіліктер,білімберусaпaсы, Кaно моделі.
Cite
Citations (0)
In his article, Charles F. Manski (Manski [2009]) elaborates on a topic that is familiar to economists, namely the normative question concerning which policy a social planner should implement to maximize welfare. Suppose a benevolent planner has a set of available policies 7' of which he can implement a particular policy t. Each policy affects individual outcomes for the members of society. The effectiveness of policies, the treatment response, is therefore characterized by a mapping of policies t e Τ into outcomes y(t) e Y for the different members j of the population (or the society at large), yjs(·): Τ -» Y. The treatment response can, in general, differ across the members of the population, and can also depend on the particular state of the world, s e S. Given a measure of welfare, such as a utilitarian welfare function, the planner can evaluate the effect of a policy on the population at large. Of course, in this canonical model the planner should choose the policy that maximizes social welfare and that implements the first-best allocation under the given environment.
Social planner
Planner
Social welfare function
Cite
Citations (0)