Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction
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Double auction
Market mechanism
Mechanism Design
Mathematic models of incentive mechanism are designed with mathematic analytic methods and game theory.Supervision mechanism is considered and analyzed in the design of incentive mechanism.This extends the theory framework of the incentive mechanism.The results are as following.Supervision mechanism is related with incentive mechanism.They can replace each other.They can encourage or guide the agent to work hard.Therefore,the function of the incentive mechanism and the supervision mechanism should be considered synthetically in the design of the incentive contract.The analyses of supervision mechanism in the incentive mechanism not only have theoretical innovation,but also have bigger application value in practice.
Mechanism Design
Incentive program
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Double auction
Market mechanism
Mechanism Design
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We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the intended behavior. We show that this can be explained by models of social preferences and introduce the notion of a social-preference-robust mechanism. We characterize an optimal mechanism in this class and present experimental evidence that it successfully controls behavior. We finally show that this mechanism is more profitable only if deviations from selfish behavior are sufficiently frequent.
Mechanism Design
Social Preferences
Fraction (chemistry)
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Mechanism design is concerned with the design of strategic environments to achieve desired outcomes at equilibria of the resulting game. We briefly overview central ideas in mechanism design. We survey both objectives the mechanism designer may seek to achieve and equilibrium concepts the designer may use to model agents. We conclude by discussing a seminal example of mechanism design at work: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms.
Mechanism Design
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Mechanism Design
Bridge (graph theory)
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Robots with straight-line output have many advantages over others, especially in case of precision-grasping and dealing with small or thick objects, the straight-line mechanism is the key element to achieve aimed functions for most of this kind of robots. This paper proposes a novel straight line mechanism and details its application in robot design. The proposed mechanism consists of three bars with linear input and straight-line output motion. This mechanism has a simpler structure than most other existing straight-line mechanisms. The geometric proof of its working principle is given. Besides, simulations are conducted to explore other possible straight line mechanisms based on the proposed mechanism and a general method to generate straight-line mechanism is proposed. Furthermore, the motion properties of the linear output as well as how the parameters of the bars influence the shape of the guides were analyzed. The results of the analysis indicate the proposed mechanism has relatively stable output speed. Straight-line mechanisms are commonly used in the industrial sector, taking the design of robot hand as an example, the author discusses the potential for the mechanism to be applied in robot design. The hand was designed based on the proposed straight-line mechanism, it can perform linear-parallel grasping to meet application requirements. The proposed mechanism can have much potential in future research.
Line (geometry)
Mechanism Design
Linear motion
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It is an important problem in the economical and social development to choose which kind of the educational operation mechanism. The educational operation mechanism adapting to national conditions can greatly improve the development of educational undertakings in our country. This article analyses the basic nature of the educational operation mechanism. At the same time it proves that the educational market mechanism is the fundamental mechanism of the educational operation mechanism and elaborates th basic attribute of the new educational operation mechanism. What's more, it also briefly shows us the way and measurement which ensure that the educational operation mechanism could run continuedly stablely and healthily.
Market mechanism
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Mechanism Design
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Mechanism design is the main method to design game rules.Supposing the agent in the game theory is self-interested,the best result is also can be concluded with mechanism designing.Revelation principle is one of the basic principles of mechanism design.The essay proves that provided the rational restraint is given to algorithm and communications,revelation principle will be invalid.When the single-stage mechanism is shifted to multi-stage mechanism,index calculation can be reduced to linear calculation so that the complexity of mechanism will be improved.
Revelation
Mechanism Design
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In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that ensures participation. Even though these modified double auctions are not incentive efficient, they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model.
Double auction
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