A cost-effective analysis of the layered approach to physical security

An examination of the layers of safeguards and security elements which provide in-depth protection for nuclear facilities is a well accepted approach to the analysis and design of their physical security systems. For example, moving from outside to inside, in a typical facility, there are detection, delay, and access control elements at the limited area (LA) and protected area (PA) perimeters, at the building walls and portals, and at one or more interior material access areas (MAA`s). This paper examines the cost-effectiveness of the various layers with the object of providing additional insight into their design, construction, and use within the facility safeguards and security plan. Specifically, it examines comparative trade-offs between investments in exterior perimeter layers versus building and interior layers. The analytical part of the examination relies heavily on the modelling of detection and delay values provided at each layer by its combined safeguards and security elements. It is intended that this analysis will provide a basis for further study leading to more cost-effective safeguards and security investments in a time of shrinking budgets.