With the signing and implementation of the Paris Agreement, low-carbon models have become the general trend for future development. In this context, many countries have successively introduced relevant low-carbon systems within their companies. These systems bring a lot of pressure on traditional manufacturing enterprises. This study deeply explores the influential mechanism of system pressure on the theory of low-carbon innovation of enterprises. It analyzed 328 questionnaires from 107 enterprises in China by using theoretical models based on the upper echelons theory and the dynamic capability theory. The results of the study indicate that (1) system pressure significantly promotes enterprises’ low-carbon innovation; (2) low-carbon dynamic capability mediates between system pressure and enterprise low-carbon innovation; (3) executives’ low-carbon awareness positively moderates the relationship between system pressure and low-carbon dynamic capability; (4) executive low-carbon awareness moderates the intermediary role of low-carbon dynamic capability between system pressure and enterprise low-carbon innovation. Theoretically, this study deepens empirical studies on system pressure and enterprise low-carbon innovation. This study contributes to the application of the upper echelons theory, dynamic ability theory and enterprise behavior theory in the field of low-carbon research. In view of this, this study intends to serve as a reference material for future low-carbon innovation-related research and a guide for the low-carbon management of enterprises.
In this paper we introduce competitive spatial market models with direct demand functions, which permit policy interventions in the form of price controls. We derive variational inequality formulations of the governing economic conditions and establish existence and uniqueness results. A decomposition algorithm that exploits the network structure is proposed and convergence results given. The algorithm is then interpreted as an adjustment process to highlight the underlying economic behavior. Finally, numerical results for a variety of problems are presented.
Whereas Grids enable the sharing, selection, query and aggregation of geographically distributed resources for solving large-scale problems, providing efficient resource allocation mechanism managing Grid resources is a complex undertaking. In this work, we consider the problem of engineering agents that act as proxies for the procurement of computational and data resources. Since applications may require multiple Grid services, mechanisms such as single-good auctions may not be appropriate for the management of these services, we propose a new scheduling algorithm based on multi-unit auction. We provide the design of prices announcement, agent creation and resource situation submission, bidding rules, and temporary allocation rules. A simulation environment is established based on the Gridsim toolkit and the simulation experiments indicate that the algorithm needs less communication and meet the requirements of user's QoS better than the conventional algorithms.
Consider a firm promotes its products through several Internet media with a fixed Internet marketing budget and models the budget allocation decisions as a competitive game, in which each firm formulates its own optimization model that is influenced by the competitors' moves as well. One challenge to the application of such model in practice is how to deal with asymmetric information. In this paper, we discuss several issues that are often asked by the practitioners that are related to dealing with asymmetric information. Among them are (1) how accurate of the estimated model used by the firm is good enough in the absence of other firms' strategy information; and (2) what the indicators are that currently used model becomes outdated.