This paper aims to examine how subnational individualism-collectivism affect the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) establishment mode in a host country, greenfield versus acquisition. We propose that firms locating in regions of high collectivism (individualism) tend to choose the acquisition (greenfield) over the greenfield (acquisition). This is because individualism highlights the control, autonomy and self-concept which can be achieved by the greenfield whereas collectivism promotes the cooperation at a sacrifice of self-concept for the benefits of the group benefits. Using China as an empirical context, we capture the subnational individualism-collectivism with the rice-wheat paddy distributions in China following a publication in Science and find support for our hypotheses. We also find that the positive effect of subnational collectivism on the choice of acquisition is stronger for SOEs than for non SOEs, weaker for firms with high technology than those without. Discussion and implications are provided.
Based on KMV model, this paper empirically studies the internal relationship between groups of companies, cash holdings level and credit risk, and tentatively explores the intrinsic mechanism between cash holdings and credit risk of state-owned groups of companies.The research shows that :(1) compared with companies with independent legal persons, the cash holdings level of listed subsidiaries of groups of companies is lower, and the cash holdings level of state-owned and private groups of companies is significantly different;(2) the cash holdings level of listed companies is negatively correlated with the credit risk, but the state-owned ownership property weakens the relationship;(3) at the groups of companies level, the negative correlation between cash holdings level and credit risk is only maintained in the groups of companies with private ownership property.
A business group is a complex system; thus it is much more difficult to predict its credit risk than that of an individual company. This study proposes an iterative model, which describes the internal interactions and dynamic credit risk of a business group. The proposed model was analyzed from a complex dynamics perspective. The simulation results based on this model show that chaos will emerge in the credit risk of a business group due to the dynamic decision-making processes of its subsidiaries, even if the interactions in the business group are fairly simple. The results of this study might explain some economic phenomena, and they also provide insights into the credit risk of a business group.
Most of the studies on the impact of financial performance are related to the concept and measurement methods of social responsibility, the direction of relationship between the two is based on the perspective of shareholding structure, etc. This paper mainly compares the relevant literature from the above three aspects.
The dissatisfaction of the literary education was first embodied in the un-literaturization in the literary reading.The literary reading of the people who are educated lacks the classics,drifts with the tide.They only skim and pursue the sense stimulation.The literary works are driven by the primitive desire and lack the aesthetic abilities,the ideal spirits and the reflection of the bright and great ideals pursuit.The second manifestation is the un-literaturization of the literary education which is conservative,dismembered.The literary education lacks the soul of the literature,the method of the literary appreciation and the training of the aesthetic abilities.
Abstract Innovation plays a critical role in shaping market advantages and leading technology competition. Meanwhile, innovations have spillover effects that are beneficial to others, even though they are not involved in the practice of innovation. Innovation is full of uncertainty, which means investment is not guaranteed to pay off for innovators. Therefore, it is essential to choose the appropriate innovation strategy, especially for those leading firms with both innovative ability and bargaining power. In this paper, both uncertainty (including technical uncertainty and market uncertainty) and spillover effect are taken into consideration to explore the innovation strategies adopted by leading firms: non‐innovation, independent innovation, and collaborative innovation (i.e., co‐innovation hereafter). Furthermore, numerical analysis is conducted to explore the integration strategy that a leading firm adopts to control one of the manufacturers. The results are obtained as follows. First, the innovation of a leading supplier is always beneficial to the whole supply chain. Second, the spillover effect of co‐innovation is more significant, compared to other innovation strategies. Last, from the perspectives of profit and innovation efficiency across the supply chain, co‐innovation is the best option for a leading firm.
We take the supply chain with a supplier and a retailer as the research objects and study the contagion and spillover effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain under the scenario of the buy‐back guarantee contract. The associated credit risk in the supply chain refers to the phenomenon that the credit default of the retailer causes the credit default of the supplier or increases the probability of default. The buy‐back guarantee in the supply chain refers to the assumption by the retailer of the supplier’s buy‐back contract as a financing mechanism. At present, the buy‐back guarantee has become a new channel of contagion for the associated credit risk in the supply chain. Under the dual Stackelberg game analysis framework of the lending institutions, suppliers, and retailers, this paper clarifies the contagion mechanism of associated credit risk in the supply chain under the condition of the buy‐back guarantee and constructs mathematical models to explore the contagion and spillover effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain. The results show that, under the condition of the buy‐back guarantee, the contagion effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain has trigger thresholds, and the probability of triggering the contagion effect is related to the retailer’s order quantity, supplier’s wholesale price, and product’s market price. The contagion effect is positively affected by the buy‐back rate, production costs, and loan interest rates and negatively affected by the product’s market price. In contrast, the degree of buy‐back guarantee aggravates the negative spillover effect of the associated credit risk and raises the risk level of lending institutions.
Small and medium-sized technology-based enterprises have great difficulties in obtaining loans from commercial banks due to their high risk and small proportion of real estate. The birth of supply chain finance facilitates the financing of small, medium and micro enterprises. In recent years, with the continuous development of big data, AI and blockchain technology, the application of supply chain finance has been expanding, which has had a profound impact on the loan business of commercial banks to SMEs. Based on the fintech perspective, this paper will further discuss the application mode of supply chain finance in commercial banks on the basis of analyzing the development status of supply chain finance, and put forward policy suggestions for its future development.
Capital constraints in the supply chain have linked trade credit to the banks’ credit risk exposure. This paper focuses on how trade credit, which is widespread in the supply chain, affects the banks’ risk exposure by constructing a two-echelon Stackelberg framework in a case involving supplier dominance. A numerical analysis illustrates the following: First, the contagion intensity, which measures trade credit’s impact on the banks’ risk exposure, positively relates to the uncertainty of demand. Second, the retailer’s characteristics have a significant, moderating effect on this positive relationship between the banks’ risk exposure and the uncertainty demand. Finally, suppliers can reduce the contagion intensity by screening different types of retailers, which consequently decreases the banks’ risk exposure.
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