In this innovative theoretical book, Elizabeth Kier uses a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Kier argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, she demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to constraints, such as terms of conscription set by civilian policymakers. In richly detailed case studies, Kier examines doctrinal developments in France and Great Britain during the interwar period. She tests her cultural argument against the two most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War I explain the defensive doctrines in World War II. Imagining War addresses two important debates. It tackles a central debate in security studies: the origins of military doctrine. And by showing the power of a cultural approach, it offers an alternative to the prevailing rationalist explanations of international politics. Originally published in 1997. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
As the great upsurge of collective action that punctuated the political life of the advanced industrial nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s began to subside, a paradigm in the social movement literature emerged. Explaining the rise and nature of these and later movements as the product of the structural conditions of society, the social movement theorists argue that contemporary movements represent fundamentally forms of collective action, with goals, values, and constituents.' This paper takes issue with these claims of historical uniqueness in social movements by analyzing three cases: the Chartist movement in nineteenth-century England, the Oneida community of antebellum United States, and the West German peace movements in the post-World War II period. We will not argue that the values held by the new social movements are identical to those of the Chartists, Oneida community, and West German peace movements of the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s, but instead that many of the supposedly characteristics can be found in past movements in a variety of historical epochs and geographical settings. We argue that social movement theorists fail to consider how-or indeed whether--new social movements differ from old ones and that their structural model of explanation is an insufficient framework for the analysis of social movements generally. If a particular, historically specific set of institutional arrangements like postindustrial society or the welfare state is responsible for generating social movements, then why do we find such new characteristics in old movements? If our particular cases as well as those of social movements are products of their particular historical circumstances, then what need is there to understand the dynamics and development of social movements as a category? Examination of the political context, in addition to the structural context, in which these movements develop is necessary to adequately explain the incidence and characteristics of social movements. When such factors are taken into account, it is not surprising that social movements in different eras and under different socioeconomic structures share similar
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Based on a new Army War College study of unit cohesion in the Iraq War, Wong et al. argue that successful unit performance is determined by social cohesion (the strength of interpersonal bonds among members) rather than task cohesion (a sense of shared commitment to the unit’s mission). If correct, these conclusions have important implications for scholarship as well as for numerous U.S. military policies such as the Unit Manning System. However, this article disputes their contentions. Wong et al. ignore a large body of empirical research on military and nonmilitary groups showing that social cohesion has no independent impact on performance. They provide no evidence for the representativeness of the interview quotes they cite as evidence for the reliability or validity of their measures. Their methodology fails to meet social science standards for causal inference (e.g., ruling out causal rival factors)
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.