In Justice as Fittingness Geoffrey Cupit puts forward a strikingly original theory of the nature of justice. He maintains that injustice is to be understood as a form of unfitting treatment - typically the treatment of people as less than they are. Justice is therefore closely related to unjustified contempt and disrespect, and ultimately to desert. Cupit offers a closely argued discussion of what is at issue when people take differing views on what justice requires. He demonstrates that the language of desert provides a suitable idiom in which to address substantive questions of justice, and shows why acting justly may require respect for differing entitlements, contributions, and needs. In the course of the book many important issues in moral and political philosophy are illuminated. Cupit offers a fresh account of the nature of the obligation to keep a promise, explains how requests can generate reasons for action, and suggests a radically new approach to solving the problem of political obligation. This work will offer fascinating insights to political, moral, and legal theorists alike.
Abstract This book puts forward an original theory of the nature of justice. It maintains that injustice is to be understood as a form of unfitting treatment — typically the treatment of people as less than they are. Justice is therefore closely related to unjustified contempt and disrespect, and ultimately to desert. This book offers a discussion of what is at issue when people take differing views on what justice requires. It demonstrates that the language of desert provides a suitable idiom in which to address substantive questions of justice, and shows why acting justly may require respect for differing entitlements, contributions, and needs. In the course of the book many important issues in moral and political philosophy are illuminated. The book looks at the nature of the obligation to keep a promise, explains how requests can generate reasons for action, and suggests a new approach to solving the problem of political obligation.
This chapter discusses rewards and punishments and their relationship to justice. It considers whether justice as fittingness provides a satisfactory framework within which to discuss the relationship between justice and the practices of rewarding and punishing. There is a close association between desert and the notions of reward and punishment. Thus, it may appear that to accept justice as fittingness is to accept that reward and punishment have a particularly significant role to play in a just society, and even that to accept justice as fittingness is to be commuted to retributivism. While viewing justice as a fittingness concept is compatible with retributivism (indeed, retributivism may presuppose that justice is a fittingness concept), it is possible to accept justice as fittingness and reject retributivism.
Journal Article How Requests (And Promises) Create Obligations Get access Geoffrey Cupit Geoffrey Cupit Universities of Hong Kong and Waikato Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 177, October 1994, Pages 439–455, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220244 Published: 01 October 1994
Abstract Discrimination by age is common in all societies. While the potential for differential treatment exists across the span of life, discrimination based on age is especially associated with the young and the old. The young may be required to attend schools, be restricted in employment, be barred from voting and standing for office, be denied access to various goods and services available to adults, and be unable to make enforceable contracts.