Abstract:
In Justice as Fittingness Geoffrey Cupit puts forward a strikingly original theory of the nature of justice. He maintains that injustice is to be understood as a form of unfitting treatment - typically the treatment of people as less than they are. Justice is therefore closely related to unjustified contempt and disrespect, and ultimately to desert. Cupit offers a closely argued discussion of what is at issue when people take differing views on what justice requires. He demonstrates that the language of desert provides a suitable idiom in which to address substantive questions of justice, and shows why acting justly may require respect for differing entitlements, contributions, and needs. In the course of the book many important issues in moral and political philosophy are illuminated. Cupit offers a fresh account of the nature of the obligation to keep a promise, explains how requests can generate reasons for action, and suggests a radically new approach to solving the problem of political obligation. This work will offer fascinating insights to political, moral, and legal theorists alike.Keywords:
Injustice
Desert (philosophy)
Obligation
Contempt
Moral obligation
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Journal Article Desert and entitlement: a Rawlsian consequentialist account Get access David Cummiskey David Cummiskey Bates CollegeLewiston, Maine 04240, U.S.A. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 47, Issue 1, January 1987, Pages 15–19, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/47.1.15 Published: 01 January 1987
Entitlement (fair division)
Desert (philosophy)
Consequentialism
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Abstract Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral and political theory – and argues that its reconciliation is the essential task of any legitimate political system.
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Philosophy of language
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Egalitarianism
Desert (philosophy)
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Journal Article "Responsibility as a Condition for Desert" Get access FRED FELDMAN FRED FELDMAN Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at AmherstAmherst, MA 01003, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume 105, Issue 417, January 1996, Pages 165–168, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.417.165 Published: 01 January 1996
Desert (philosophy)
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.L. AUSTIN'S famous paper on Ifs and Cans opens with the immortal question, Are cans constitutionally iffy?' By that, he means to query whether every statement about what someone can do must, analytically, contain implicitly within it certain if' clauses (if one wants to, if one really tries, if the gods are willing, etc.). If so, then a large part of what we really mean by saying that someone can do something lies in unpacking these suppressed if' clauses. Here I want to raise an analogous question about the notion of personal deserts. To embody my thesis in a similarly catchy maxim, I shall be claiming that deserts are constitutionally wouldy. Or, to unpack that phrase, when we say x deserves we are really saying x would receive y in the course of events. Or, to unpack it further still, x would receive y, in the absence of certain interventions z. The message of this article is that, just as we must excavate the ifs to get at the cans, so too must we focus clearly on the untoward intervening factors upsetting the normal course of events in order to fix our notion of personal desert. The upshot of my argument will be that that notion is essentially negative in character. The core notion is not that of the deserved but rather that of the undeserved, of those intervening factors upsetting the normal course of events.2 In Austin's phrase, undeserved wears the trousers. To show that this is so, simply recall that desert is an inherently moralized notion: To be a notion of desert at all, it must imply that,
Desert (philosophy)
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Journal Article The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice Get access Julian Lamont Julian Lamont Loyola Marymount University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 174, January 1994, Pages 45–64, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220146 Published: 01 January 1994
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Social justice has been the animating ideal of democratic governments throughout the 20th century. even those who oppose it recognize its potency. Yet the meaning of social justice remains obscure, and existing theories put forward by political philosophers to explain it have failed to capture the way people in general think about issues of social justice. This book develops a new theory. The author argues that principles of justice must be understood contextually, with each principle finding its natural home in a different form of human association. Because modern societies are complex, the theory of justice must be complex, too. The three primary components in Miller's scheme are the principles of desert, need, and equality. The book uses empirical research to demonstrate the central role played by these principles in popular conceptions of justice. It then offers a close analysis of each concept, defending principles of desert and need against a range of critical attacks, and exploring instances when justice requires equal distribution and attacks, and exploring instances when justice requires equal distribution and when it does not. Finally, it argues that social justice understood in this way remains a viable political ideal even in a world characterized by economic globalization and political multiculturalism. This book will appeal to readers with interest in public policy as well as to students of politics, philosophy, and sociology.
Social Justice
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Journal Article Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom Get access FRED FELDMAN FRED FELDMAN Department of Philosophy University of Massachusetts at AmherstAmherst, MA 01003 USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume 104, Issue 413, January 1995, Pages 63–77, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/104.413.63 Published: 01 January 1995
Desert (philosophy)
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While rights are indispensable to our moral and political thinking, they are also mysterious and controversial. What is it for someone to have a moral right to something? What kinds of creatures are capable of having rights? Which rights do they have? As long as these questions remain unanswered, rights will remain vulnerable to sceptical doubts. This book provides the moral foundation necessary to dispel these doubts. The author does this by constructing a coherent concept of a moral right and a workable substantive theory of rights. The former arises from his analysis of moral rights as morally justified conventional rights, while the necessary justificatory framework is supplied by a consequentialist moral theory.
Moral rights
Foundation (evidence)
Creatures
Skepticism
Normative ethics
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