Abstract In 2016/2017, Washington State experienced a mumps outbreak despite high childhood vaccination rates, with cases more frequently detected among school-aged children and members of the Marshallese community. We sequenced 166 mumps virus genomes collected during outbreaks in Washington and other US states, and apply phylodynamic approaches to trace mumps introductions and transmission within Washington. We uncover that mumps was introduced into Washington at least 13 times, primarily from Arkansas, sparking multiple co-circulating transmission chains. Neither vaccination status nor age were strong determinants of transmission. Instead, the outbreak in Washington was overwhelmingly sustained by transmission within the Marshallese community. Our findings underscore the utility of genomic data to clarify epidemiologic factors driving transmission, and pinpoint contact networks as critical determinants of mumps transmission. These results imply that contact structures and historic disparities may leave populations at increased risk for respiratory virus disease even when a vaccine is effective and widely used.
Abstract We describe the contact investigation for an early confirmed case of coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), in the United States. Contacts of the case-patient were identified, actively monitored for symptoms, interviewed for a detailed exposure history, and tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection by real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) and ELISA. Fifty contacts were identified and 38 (76%) were interviewed, of whom 11 (29%) reported unprotected face-to-face interaction with the case-patient. Thirty-seven (74%) had respiratory specimens tested by rRT-PCR, and all tested negative. Twenty-three (46%) had ELISA performed on serum samples collected ≈6 weeks after exposure, and none had detectable antibodies to SARS-CoV-2. Among contacts who were tested, no secondary transmission was identified in this investigation, despite unprotected close interactions with the infectious case-patient.
Rabies is a zoonotic viral disease that can affect all mammals. In the United States, the majority of human rabies cases are caused by bats, which are the only known reservoirs for rabies virus (RABV) in Washington State. We sought to characterize bat RABV epidemiology in Washington among bats submitted by the public for RABV testing.We examined temporal and spatial trends in RABV positivity (% positive) for taxonomically identified bats submitted to diagnostic laboratories during 2006-2017. For a subset of Myotis species, we evaluated sensitivity and predictive value positive (PPV) of morphological identification keys, using mitochondrial markers (cytochrome b) as a reference. For bats tested during 2000-2016, we analyzed RABV positivity by circumstances of encounters with humans, cats, and dogs.During 2006-2017, RABV positivity for all bat species was 6.0% (176/2,928). Among species with ≥100 submissions, RABV positivity was 2.0%-11.7% and highest among big brown bats (Eptesicus fuscus). An increasing trend in annual positivity was significant only for big brown bats (P = 0.02), and was circumstantially linked to a geographic cluster. Sensitivity and PPV of morphological identification keys was high for M. evotis but varied for M. lucifugus, M. californicus, M. yumanensis, and M. septentrionalis. A positive RABV result was significantly associated with nonsynanthropic species, abnormal behavior, abnormal hiding, injury, biting, found in a body of water, found alive, found outdoors, and caught by a dog.Monitoring passive RABV surveillance trends enables public health authorities to perform more accurate risk assessments. Differences in temporal and spatial trends in RABV positivity by bat species indicate the importance of collecting taxonomic data, although morphological identification can be unreliable for certain Myotis species. Current public health practices for RABV exposures should be maintained as RABV infection in bats can never be excluded without diagnostic testing.
In 2016/2017, Washington State experienced a mumps outbreak despite high childhood vaccination rates, with cases more frequently detected among school-aged children and members of the Marshallese community. We sequenced 166 mumps virus genomes collected in Washington and other US states, and traced mumps introductions and transmission within Washington. We uncover that mumps was introduced into Washington approximately 13 times, primarily from Arkansas, sparking multiple co-circulating transmission chains. Although age and vaccination status may have impacted transmission, our data set could not quantify their precise effects. Instead, the outbreak in Washington was overwhelmingly sustained by transmission within the Marshallese community. Our findings underscore the utility of genomic data to clarify epidemiologic factors driving transmission and pinpoint contact networks as critical for mumps transmission. These results imply that contact structures and historic disparities may leave populations at increased risk for respiratory virus disease even when a vaccine is effective and widely used.
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. In response to the first cases identified in the United States, close contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases were investigated to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified and monitored daily for development of symptoms (active monitoring). Selected close contacts (including those with exposures categorized as higher risk) were targeted for collection of additional exposure information and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Four hundred four close contacts were actively monitored in the jurisdictions that managed the travel-related cases. Three hundred thirty-eight of the 404 close contacts provided at least basic exposure information, of whom 159 close contacts had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all actively monitored close contacts, two additional symptomatic COVID-19 cases (i.e., secondary cases) were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. When considering only household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested for SARS-CoV-2, the secondary attack rate (i.e., the number of secondary cases as a proportion of total close contacts) was 13% (95% CI: 4-38%). The results from these contact tracing investigations suggest that household members, especially significant others, of COVID-19 cases are at highest risk of becoming infected. The importance of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers is also underlined. Isolation of persons with COVID-19, in combination with quarantine of exposed close contacts and practice of everyday preventive behaviors, is important to mitigate spread of COVID-19.
ABSTRACT Background Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. As part of initial response activities in the United States, enhanced contact investigations were conducted to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. Methods Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified. Close contacts meeting criteria for active monitoring were followed, and selected individuals were targeted for collection of additional exposure details and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Results There were 404 close contacts who underwent active monitoring in the response jurisdictions; 338 had at least basic exposure data, of whom 159 had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all known close contacts under monitoring, two additional cases were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. The secondary attack rate among household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested, was 13% (95% CI: 4 – 38%). Conclusions The enhanced contact tracing investigations undertaken around nine early travel-related cases of COVID-19 in the United States identified two cases of secondary transmission, both spouses. Rapid detection and isolation of the travel-associated case patients, enabled by public awareness of COVID-19 among travelers from China, may have mitigated transmission risk among close contacts of these cases.
