In this paper we propose the following hypothesis: the hard problem of consciousness is in part an artifact of what we call the unitary approach to phenomenal consciousness. The defining mark of the unitary approach is that it views consciousness and phenomenality as inseparable. Giving up this conceptual commitment redefines, in a productive way, the explanatory tasks of the theory of consciousness. Adopting a non-unitary conception of experience does not make the hard problem of consciousness go away completely but it shifts the locus of where the explanation of experience gets really difficult, and cuts down the mystery of consciousness to size. Other advantages of the non-unitary account of consciousness are sketched as well.
There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.
The estimation of plant growth is a challenging but key issue that may help us to understand crop vs. environment interactions. To perform precise and high-throughput analysis of plant growth in field conditions, remote sensing using LiDAR and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has been developed, in addition to other approaches. Although there are software tools for the processing of LiDAR data in general, there are no specialized tools for the automatic extraction of experimental field blocks with crops that represent specific “points of interest”. Our tool aims to detect precisely individual field plots, small experimental plots (in our case 10 m2) which in agricultural research represent the treatment of a single plant or one genotype in a breeding trial. Cutting out points belonging to the specific field plots allows the user to measure automatically their growth characteristics, such as plant height or plot biomass. For this purpose, new method of edge detection was combined with Fourier transformation to find individual field plots. In our case study with winter wheat, two UAV flight levels (20 and 40 m above ground) and two canopy surface modelling methods (raw points and B-spline) were tested. At a flight level of 20 m, our algorithm reached a 0.78 to 0.79 correlation with LiDAR measurement with manual validation (RMSE = 0.19) for both methods. The algorithm, in the Python 3 programming language, is designed as open-source and is freely available publicly, including the latest updates.
Abstract We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.
One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (in section 2) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
Základní principy Freudova Projektu vědecké psychologie Abstrakt: Stať se snaží analyzovat myšlenky málo známého rukopisu Sigmunda Freuda z roku 1895, v němž usiloval o nalezení biologických základů lidské psychiky. Tato práce je pozoruhodná ze dvou důvodů. Jednak představuje úvahy, které se výrazně od- lišují od toho, co je pro Freuda v oblasti psychologie tak typické. Freud se zde, až na výjimky, nezabývá psychoanalýzou či studiemi o hysterii, nýbrž popisuje, co by mohlo být základem těchto psychologických jevů na neurofyziologické úrovni. Druhým pozoruhodným faktem je, že tento manuskript byl pozapome- nut až do poloviny 20. století, kdy byl vytištěn pod názvem Projekt vědecké psychologie. A jak je známo, neurofyziologická studia lidské mysli spojená s analýzou kognitivních funkcí se v ri- gorózní podobě objevují až na počátku 60. let. Stať se proto pokouší ukázat základní principy Projektu a naznačit, v čem byl Freud inspirativním průkopníkem moderních neurofyziologických přístupů k lidské mysli. Klíčová slova: Freud; vědecká psychologie; neurofyziologie; mysl Basic Principles of Freud's Project for Scientific Psychology Abstract: This paper focuses on Sigmund Freud's manuscript that he wrote in 1895 as a series of letters seeking for biological foundations of human mind. This work significantly differs from what is so typical for Freud as a psychologist. With few exceptions, Freud is not engaged here with psychoanalysis and studies on hysteria, but describes what could be the basis of psychological phenomena at neurophysiological level. Another remarkable fact is that this manuscript was forgotten until the mid-twentieth century when it was published under the title Project for Scientific Psychology. And as we know, neurophysiological studies as rigorous studies of the human mind associated with the analysis of cognitive functions appeared first at the beginning of 60's. The article therefore attempts to show the basic principles of the Project as well as to outline some of the issues that connect Freud to contemporary ideas in neurophysiology of human mind. Keywords: Freud; scientific psychology; neurophysiology; mind /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Normální tabulka"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";}
This paper is addressing an issue of distributed systems designing aimed at automated prototyping of Cyclic Concurrent Processes Systems. In such systems concurrent processes compete for access to shared system resources. In order to ensure that a system is deadlock and starvation-free, certain conditions must be satisfied. In this paper, these conditions guarantee that for a given pair (an initial state, a set of dispatching rules) the system - belonging to a specific class - has a steady cyclic state. However, system designers are interested in values of performance indices, such as a rate of resources or processes utilization or the period of the system cycle. Nowadays, the values of performance indices are provided mainly as a result of a simulation process, which requires much more processor power than in case of an analytical method. Thus, in this paper the authors focus on providing a procedure that enables building analytical models of Cyclic Concurrent Processes Systems belonging to a system class considered in the paper. To reach this aim the max-plus algebra formalism is employed. Both the conditions ensuring a cyclic process flow and steps of the procedure are the basis of a software tool, which can be used by designers to prototype systems of desired values of the performance indices. Thanks to the computer program the designers receive a useful tool that helps to validate and allocate distributed control procedures, even in a complex system, which is a composition of simpler systems. The procedure together with the software tool is the main outcome of this paper.
The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The paper elaborates the distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and sketches advantages of the proposed reconceptualization.
The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if "constitutive" means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT either preserves unconscious intentional states, but then must reject constitutiveness, or conversely, sPIT accepts constitutiveness but must acknowledge unconscious phenomenality. It is argued that the second option – i.e. accepting unconscious phenomenality – offers an interesting way to preserve sPIT. This counterintuitive solution is labeled a "dual model" here. Accepting the dual model not only as a conceptual possibility but as a factual case – supported by conceptual and empirical arguments – could be a plausible proposal for solving the dilemma.
Our world is rather uncertain. However, this does not mean the exclusive presence of randomness. On the contrary, most concepts are “fuzzy”, containing inherent linguistic uncertainty (i.e., imprecise description of concepts such as low price, young people, tall men) or informational uncertainty (caused by missing or incomplete information). In other words, fuzziness refers to nonstatistical imprecision, approximation and vagueness in information and data.