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    Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality
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    Abstract:
    The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if "constitutive" means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT either preserves unconscious intentional states, but then must reject constitutiveness, or conversely, sPIT accepts constitutiveness but must acknowledge unconscious phenomenality. It is argued that the second option – i.e. accepting unconscious phenomenality – offers an interesting way to preserve sPIT. This counterintuitive solution is labeled a "dual model" here. Accepting the dual model not only as a conceptual possibility but as a factual case – supported by conceptual and empirical arguments – could be a plausible proposal for solving the dilemma.
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    Intentionality
    In "The Myth of Original Intentionality," Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. Humans lack original intentionality. Humans have derived intentionality only. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett's discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the contents of thoughts.
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    Content (measure theory)
    Citations (58)
    Intentionality,as a fundamental concept of phenomenology,is also of great importance for phenomenology of technology.Don Ihde advanced the concept of technological intentionality based on the thoughts of Hussel,Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,in an attempt to demonstrate mediated role that technology has played in the relationship between human being and the world.On this basis,Peter-Paul · Verbeek has proposed the concept of technological artifact intentionality which rooted in Post phenomenology and took into account the co-shaping role between human intentionality and the technological intentionality.The article will try to simply describe the mainline of the concept of intentionality,and that of technological intentionality.In the end,we will arrive at some conclusions.
    Intentionality
    Citations (0)
    Abstract Recent work on the nature of intentionality has focused on the connection between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. The notion of phenomenal intentionality, in particular, has surfaced in the literature in the late nineties and has commanded ever growing interest. The very definition of phenomenal intentionality is contested, but broadly speaking, this is supposed to be a kind of intentionality a mental state has in virtue of its phenomenal character. This book explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality, in particular whether there is any such thing, how common it is (with particular focus on whether it occurs in non-sensory, purely cognitive states), and what place it might hold in the overall theory of intentionality.
    Intentionality
    J.Seale has boldly improved the traditional theory of intentionality.Based on naturalism,he thinks that intentionality has its positions in the nature,so he does not maintain reduction and simplification.And he thinks intentionality isn't the sole characteristic of mental state,because something except human beings has intentionality on the meaning of signifying,metaphor and spin-off.His theory of intentionality symbolizes the new philosophy direction,which is putting the illocutionary acts into the mental background and showing the mental intentionality by language aimed at formulating the theory of intentionality.
    Intentionality
    Naturalism
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    In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading’s derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob’s alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible.
    Intentionality
    This book contains eleven original papers about intentionality. Some explore current problems such as the status of intentional content, the intentionality of perception and emotion, the connections between intentionality and normativity, the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, the characteristics of the intentional idiom. Others discuss the work of historical figures like Locke, Brentano, Husserl and Frege.
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    The article addresses Husserl's concept(s) of intentionality, focused on act-intentionality and stream-intentionality. First, I will present intentionality as a feature of acts of being directed toward objects, following the model of perception. Second, I will outline Husserl's redefinition of intentionality for encompassing new phenomena. Third, I will focus on the phenomenology of time in order to analyze the intentionality of the absolute flow as a form of intentionality which cannot be defined in terms of the relation to an object. My goal will be to answer the questions of how intentionality can be understood at the level of the flow and whether there is for Husserl one single concept of intentionality.
    Intentionality
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