Collusion prevention mechanism in PPP highway projects: Optimal government subsidy, toll and penalty
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We reconsider Tirole's framework of a three-tier principal-agent problem, in which he has shown that an incentive problem is caused by the possibility of monetary side payments between the agent and the middle -level supervisor. We consider the case where monetary transfers are not possible, but a different, implicit kind of collusion arises because the supervisor cares about the utility enjoyed by his subordinate. This approach avoids the crucial problem of how an explicit side contract could be enforced. We show that the difference in the cause of collusion leads to a difference in the way in which collusion is prevented: the agent's incentive scheme is used to give incentives to the supervisor. An interdependence between incentive schemes thus follows from utility interdependence.
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This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion in a duopoly. Collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances, predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors, collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot–Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors, it is always optimal to predate a colluding firm, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
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This paper describes a principal-agent relationship with a supervisor who has information about the agent. The agent and the supervisor have the possibility to collude and misinform the principal. In accordance with the existing literature there exists an optimal contract which excludes collusion in equilibrium. The optimal contract exhibits, however, ex-post inefficient and creates scope for renegotiation. If a renegotiation-stage is incorporated in the game then for some parameter constellations the optimal contract is a contract which necessarily induces collusion. The paper thus shows that the principal's behavior toward ex-post inefficiencies may determine whether collusion occurs in equilibrium.
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ABSTRACT. Löschian duopoly under heterogeneous cost conditions is examined to show that it is not equivalent, contra past findings, to spatial collusion. Moreover, within the confines of the assumed demand and cost conditions spatial collusion is shown to be superior to Loschian competition in terms of both (aggregate) consumer surplus and producer surplus, which implies a possible welfare gain from collusion. A general, if not the general, prices‐and‐welfare comparison of alternative pricing schema including collusive, Löschian, and optimal pricing is summarily presented in a table.
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This paper deals with the equilibrium strategies on complementary takeover collusion.Considering the incomplete information of the value on the target and based on the bidding model,we manifest the incentive for collusions and resolve the rational interest compensation,and then get the equilibrium collusion strategies.Furthermore,we analyze the response strategies of the target firm's reservation price.It is shown that the bidding collusion does not erode the economic benefit of takeover,and the target firm can restrain from collusion by setting a reasonable reservation price.
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