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    This paper introduces a core concept in an economy with an excludable public good. In the economy, we assume that each coalition is allowed to achieve an allocation via a menu, a kind of a nonlinear price. Our core concept is called the menu-induced core that is defined as the set of allocations achievable by menus that are robust against all coalitional improvements achieved via menus. We show that the menu-induced core is nonempty. We also investigate certain properties of the menu-induced core that show the difference between the menu-induced core and the core defined in a standard way.
    Excludability
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    Discussions on the selection of core periodicals and relevant issues are presented in the article.It's pointed out that the negative influence of core periodicals comes from the misuse of core periodicals rather than the periodicals themselves.It's proposed that the selection method of core periodicals should be perfected,and a scientific periodical evaluation system is waiting to be constructed before the core competitiveness of core periodicals can be further sharpened.
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    This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.
    Sequence (biology)
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    In this paper, we introduce a new concept of core by extending the definition of deviation. The traditional definition of deviation allows for players to deviate if some profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Hence, our core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties that our new core satisfies and provide a sufficient condition for being nonempty. Moreover, we apply Ray's (1989) credibility to our core.
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    A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core--there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
    Transferable utility
    Feature (linguistics)
    Core model
    Citations (4)