An Empirical Analysis of the Public Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Finding the Missing Piece to the Puzzle
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China’s public enforcement regime has long been blamed for insufficiently and ineffectively deterring securities crimes. We collect data on public enforcement outcomes from documents disclosed by listed firms and find that the outputs of law enforcement have increased significantly since 2011, thanks to the efforts of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)’s 38 regional offices. However, due to the lack of a reliable private enforcement regime and the limitations of monetary penalties, the general enforcement of securities law is still regarded as weak. In addition, there exists a salient pattern of selective enforcement. Privately owned listed firms face a harsher regulatory environment in terms of both the number and severity of sanctions from regulators, whereas state-owned, and particularly central-government-controlled firms enjoy the most favorable treatment, although the gap has been reduced in recent years.Keywords:
Securities fraud
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Vigorous enforcement is a critical component of any credible environmental protection program. Congress recognized that fact when it enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972. The Act, therefore, contains an enforceable pollution control scheme, more than adequate federal enforcement tools, and calls upon the states and private citizens to aid in the enforcement of the Act. Unfortunately, enforcement efforts at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have lapsed several times in the recent past. This article explores a form of self-regulation that would create an ex ante limit on politically motivated attempts to undermine the Act through non-enforcement. While not fail-proof, the full blossoming of a proud, independent law enforcement culture within EPA's enforcement staff may be one of the most feasible ways in which to maintain a stable and vital enforcement program.
Clean Water Act
Clean Air Act
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Contract violations are frequent due to the high uncertainty and complexity of construction projects. However, enforcement after a violation has received limited attention. This study distinguishes between three types of violations, i.e., letter violations, mutually agreed spirit violations, and unilaterally assumed spirit violations, based on the documentation and mutuality dimensions. By using the data collected from Chinese general contractors, this study concludes that compared with unilaterally assumed spirit violations, violations of high mutuality of obligations (the first two violations) will lead to more severe contractual and reputational enforcement while with high mutuality, whether the violated obligations are written in the contract or not (corresponding to the first two violations, respectively) does not significantly affect the severity of enforcement. The mediating effects of relational risk perception on the aforementioned effects are empirically supported. This study contributes to the enforcement literature by exploring the effects of the characteristics of violations, especially violations of undocumented elements of contracts, on enforcement and fills the gaps in the scarce literature on reputational enforcement and its antecedents. Project managers can benefit from this study by recognizing the application of reputational enforcement and making better alignment between different types of violations and enforcement.
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Abstract Compliance and enforcement are important issues from an economic point of view because management measures are useless without a certain level of enforcement. These conclusions come from the well-established theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement problems within fisheries. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating compliance and enforcement in the empirical case of a mixed trawl fishery targeting Norway lobster in Kattegat and Skagerrak located north of Denmark with help from a simulated model. The paper presents results from two simulation models of the case study: one for a single output and a single enforcement tool and one for multiple outputs and multiple enforcement tools. The results of the simulation models are compared to the benchmark case, defined as the enforcement situation in the baseline year. The paper discusses the consequences of policy intervention at the level of compliance and the private and social benefits of varying enforcement intensities, penalties and management measures as well as combinations thereof. The empirical investigation of the case study indicates the current level of control is too low compared to the optimal level of enforcement. Another conclusion from the case study is that only small welfare effects are obtained by increasing enforcement efforts to reduce non-compliance.
Benchmark (surveying)
Empirical Research
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An important part of the debate about self vs state-governance involves a discussion about enforcement mechanisms. While some scholars argue that private enforcement mechanisms work sufficiently well in supporting cooperation, others cite the downfalls of private mechanisms so as to legitimize government enforcement. This paper focuses on the interplay between government and private enforcement mechanisms. Using an experimental approach, we demonstrate two results. First, we show that government enforcement, in the form of a centralized monetary punishment in our experiment, can be useful if aligned with and implemented after a private form of enforcement, namely peer disapproval. However, our second result suggests that the removal of government enforcement leads to a substantial decrease in overall cooperation levels – cooperation levels are higher under private enforcement when subjects had never experienced government enforcement compared to when they had been exposed to government enforcement. Specifically, the removal of government enforcement undermines the power of the remaining private enforcement mechanism to affect the behavior of free-riders.
Punishment (psychology)
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We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a “single enforcer punishment equilibrium,” where any deviation by a regular agent is punished only once, and only by enforcers. In contrast, enforcers themselves are disciplined (at least in part) by community enforcement. The reason why there is no community enforcement following deviations by regular agent is that such actions, by reducing future cooperation, would decrease the amount of punishment that enforcers are willing to impose on deviators. Conversely, when the specialized enforcement technology is ineffective, optimal equilibria do punish deviations by regular agents with community enforcement. The model thus predicts that societies with more advanced enforcement technologies should rely on specialized enforcement, while less technologically advanced societies should rely on community enforcement. Our results hold both under perfect monitoring of actions and under various types of private monitoring.
Punishment (psychology)
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Argument (complex analysis)
Private information retrieval
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This chapter examines empirical legal research carried out into the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights by creative industry rightholders. Setting the analysis in context against research into intellectual property enforcement generally, the chapter highlights that there has been relatively little empirical research into civil enforcement relating specifically to the creative industries. The chapter reviews findings from relevant studies from across a number of different jurisdictions. The chapter concludes with reflections on those findings and suggestions for further empirical legal research into intellectual property enforcement in the creative industries in the future.
Empirical Research
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We identify and explain significant differences between the compliance enforcement systems of three cap-and-trade programmes: the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the US SO 2 emission trading programme and the Kyoto Protocol. Because EU-ETS’s compliance enforcement system is somewhat less potent than that of US SO 2 , but vastly more potent than Kyoto’s, it might be tempting to predict that EU-ETS will (1) not quite achieve the SO 2 programme’s near-perfect compliance rates, yet (2) achieve significantly better compliance rates than Kyoto. However, we offer a novel theoretical framework suggesting that how compliance enforcement affects compliance will depend on how the emission trading programme addresses participation. We conclude that while (1) will likely prove correct, (2) will not; Kyoto may even outperform EU-ETS compliance-wise because whereas EU-ETS (and US SO 2 ) specify mandatory participation, most Kyoto member countries participate voluntarily.
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Abstract To achieve compliance with a regulation, the manner of enforcement may matter as much as the level of enforcement. Classroom games can encourage students to think creatively about alternative tactics. This article examines a situation with “safety in numbers” for potential violators, when monitoring is easy but only a few violators can be penalized. A simple interactive exercise can be used to compare random enforcement, in which individuals are selected at random for inspection, with sequential enforcement, in which individuals are checked in a known order. Sequential enforcement completely dominates random enforcement in reducing both the number of violators and the number receiving penalties. This memorable game engages students to consider various enforcement strategies.
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