Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency
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In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.Keywords:
Equity
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This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalition strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. Due to these restrictions the outcomes of the allocation rule are Pareto efficient only for some preference profiles. In a multi-object auction interpretation of the model, the result is a complete characterization of coalition strategy-proof auction rules.
Fair division
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Pareto optimal
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We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1) strategy-proofness, budget-balance, treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (2) strategy-proofness, equal rights lower bound, treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability, (3) strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, no-trade-no-transfer, treatment of equals, weak decision-efficiency, and simple generatability.
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We adopt a welfarist approach to study sequencing problems in a private information setup. The ”generalized minimum welfare bound” (GMWB) is a universal representation
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For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof.
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