Family Pay Premium in Large Business Group Firms
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In this study, we empirically test the predictions that the family pay discount documented in the literature for U.S. firms does not hold in a business group setting and that this is attributable to the lack of monitoring by other family members. We find evidence consistent with these predictions using Korean data. First, family executives receive higher compensation than non-family executives (i.e., the family pay premium) in business group firms (chaebols). Second, we find that the pay offered to family executives tends to be high when the proportion of shares held by other family members is low, which is typically the case in business group firms.Keywords:
Family business
Corporate group
Executive compensation
Family member
This paper examines whether compensation committee composition affects CEO compensation practices. We find that CEOs receive preferential treatment (at shareholders' expense) when insiders are members of the compensation committee. We do not find that CEO compensation is greater in firms that have insiders on the compensation committee than it is in firms that do not. However, we show that the relation between CEO compensation and performance is more favorable toward the CEO (i.e., biased in the CEO's favor at shareholder expense) among the firms that have insiders on the compensation committee.
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Abstract This paper explores family business groups and their motivation for risk taking in each affiliate. We study whether the controlling family determines the level of risk taken by an affiliate in its business group based on the amount of family wealth that is invested in the affiliate. We find that the affiliates in which the controlling family has more (less) investment take less (more) risk. Our results indicate that the controlling family decides the riskiness of each affiliate based on the family’s interests at both the firm level and the business‐group level.
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This research tests whether a war for talent provides an explanation for the rise in executive compensation in recent years. According to this, a shift toward transferable managerial skills requires higher compensation, particularly in large firms, to attract and retain managerial talents. Relying on an internationalized and deregulated managerial labor market, i.e. the Swiss banking sector, the empirical findings show that a shift in large firms explains the rise in executive compensation but does not improve firm performance. It is discussed how transferable managerial skills may used to legitimize higher compensation at the top.
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Emerging markets witness a significant overlap between social communities, families and business activities. This paper attempts to decipher a source of heterogeneity, which is business group affiliation among family firms. This paper details the reasons why business group affiliation is beneficial in an emerging market by employing the concept of parenting to reconcile the potential deficiencies of business group affiliation pointed out by various strategy scholars. We use two proxies to measure the extent of parenting namely, firm leadership by a family member and promoting family’s shareholding in the group affiliate company. The study has been conducted in the Indian economic context using a dataset consisting of 3,728 listed companies. Results show that superior parenting realized by professional firm leadership and higher promoter shareholding leads to superior financial performance among family business group firms.
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Based on the panel data analysis of Taiwan’s family business groups from 1988 to 2002, this research attempts to investigate the relationships among overlapping investment, use of particularistic ties, group performance, and succession in family business group. The results show that the family business group’s overlapping investment between the owner-managers and family members occupying the decisive positions of group affiliates significantly influence its leader change. This study highlights the importance of alternative control choices within the family business. Furthermore, it also provides a good comparing start-point for researches interested in understanding the succession issue of Chinese family business in Great China
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Abstract We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.
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This chapter surveys the recent literature on managerial compensation, focusing on the main issues that spurred intense debate in the popular press, academia, and from regulatory agencies. In particular, the literature review discusses whether the high levels of executive compensation are justifiable, and whether executive compensation schemes induce unethical behavior by executives. While most of the empirical evidence supports the view that the high levels of executive compensation are excessive and unethical, an emerging stream of literature provides rational explanations for the observed levels of executive pay. Ample evidence also shows that some compensation packages induce executives to manipulate their pay. This chapter also summarizes a limited, but growing, literature linking managerial compensation to corporate social responsibility. This literature suggests that the structure of managerial compensation matters to corporate social performance.
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Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?
Abstract This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family‐controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.
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A well-designed executive compensation plan is important because it rewards both executives and shareholders, whereas a poorly designed one wastes corporate resources without motivating the executive. Executive compensation is also important because it affects compensation levels and composition throughout the organization. It affects the level of compensation because lower-management compensation is often a function of upper-management compensation, and it affects the composition of their compensation package because the same goals may be applied as well. The goal of the executive compensation plan is to align the interests of executives and stakeholders, commonly assumed to be shareholders. This chapter explains the composition and importance of the executive compensation package.
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