UC Commitments for Modular Protocol Design and Applications to Revocation and Attribute Tokens
10
Citation
22
Reference
10
Related Paper
Citation Trend
Keywords:
Revocation
Cryptography is a necessary technology used to provide Internet security and privacy. The global nature of the Internet means that any cryptographic protocols to be used must be agreed globally. Standardisation allows this to be achieved and also provides an important link between theoretically well founded cryptographic schemes and practical cryptographic solutions. Different countries will have their own preferred protocols and so this is not just a matter of picking a single cryptographic protocol for each given task. There needs to be a process of harmonisation by which an agreed standard is defined. In this talk, we discuss how this is achieved by using examples from the ISO organisation and the Trusted Computing Group.
Harmonization
Cite
Citations (0)
Abstract : The objective of this research is to develop an adaptive cryptographic protocol, which allows users to select an optimal cryptographic strength and algorithm based upon the hardware and bandwidth available and allows users to reason about the level of security versus the system throughput. In this constantly technically-improving society, the ability to communicate via wireless technology provides an avenue for delivering information at anytime nearly anywhere. Sensitive or classified information can be transferred wirelessly across unsecured channels by using cryptographic algorithms. The research presented will focus on dynamically selecting optimal cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic strengths based upon the hardware and bandwidth available. The research will explore the performance of transferring information using various cryptographic algorithms and strengths using different CPU and bandwidths on various sized packets or files. This research will provide a foundation for dynamically selecting cryptographic algorithms and key sizes. The conclusion of the research provides a selection process for users to determine the best cryptographic algorithms and strengths to send desired information without waiting for information security personnel to determine the required method for transferring. This capability will be an important stepping stone towards the military's vision of future Net-Centric Warfare capabilities.
Cite
Citations (0)
More and more cryptographic protocols have been used to achieve various security requirements of distributed systems in the open network environment. However cryptographic protocols are very difficult to design and analyze due to the complexity of the cryptographic protocol execution, and a large number of problems are unsolved that range from the theory framework to the concrete analysis technique. In this paper, we build a new algebra called cryptographic protocol algebra (CPA) for describing the message operations with many cryptographic primitives, and proposed a new algebra model for cryptographic protocols based on the CPA. In the model, expanding processes of the participant's knowledge on the protocol runs are characterized with some algebraic notions such as subalgebra, free generator and polynomial algebra, and attack processes are modeled with a new notion similar to that of the exact sequence used in homological algebra. Then we develope a mathematical approach to the cryptographic protocol security analysis. By using algebraic techniques, we have shown that for those cryptographic protocols with some symmetric properties, the execution space generated by an arbitrary number of participants may boil down to a smaller space generated by several honest participants and attackers. Furthermore we discuss the composability problem of cryptographic protocols and give a sufficient condition under which the protocol composed of two correct cryptographic protocols is still correct, and we finally offer a counterexample to show that the statement may not be true when the condition is not met.
Cite
Citations (0)
Abstraction
Formalism (music)
Cite
Citations (65)
Formal analysis is used to find out flaws of cryptographic protocols. A formal analysis method with reasoning for cryptographic protocols has been proposed. In the method, forward reasoning is used to deduce flaws or situations related to flaws from formalized specifications of cryptographic protocols. Analysts of cryptographic protocols pick up deduced results related to flaws from results of forward reasoning according to some criteria. However, there is no study about the criteria for what are flaws that can be applied to various cryptographic protocols. This paper presents fine-grained security properties that cryptographic protocols should satisfy in order to clarify the criteria. The paper shows the enumerated security properties are correct and valid through analyzing some cryptographic protocols.
Cite
Citations (2)
Cite
Citations (0)
Gas meter prover
Zero-knowledge proof
Cite
Citations (54)
Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed, and many studies of them have been done. However, there is no study to identify constituent elements of cryptographic protocols that are elements of the protocols consist of. The constituent elements can be used for the basis of classification of already proposed cryptographic protocols, the basis of prediction of new cryptographic protocols, and the basis of formal verification for cryptographic protocols. This paper presents primitive constituent element of cryptographic protocols that is an element so that cryptographic protocol cannot accomplish its original tasks without it.
Basis (linear algebra)
Cite
Citations (0)
Cite
Citations (0)
Bridging the gap between formal methods and cryptography has recently received a lot of interest, i.e., investigating to what extent proofs of cryptographic protocols made with abstracted cryptographic operations are valid for real implementations. This led to the notion of cryptographically faithful (sound) abstractions. These abstractions allow for a provably secure cryptographic implementation; however their incorporation into machine-aided verification of security protocols has not been properly adressed yet. The panel should serve as an opportunity to discuss the current state-of-the-art in this area of research as well as the suitability of these abstractions for tool-supported verification of cryptographic protocols. We hope that the discussion will shed light on how far both communities are still apart.
Implementation
Cite
Citations (1)