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    An Externality Analysis on the Behaviors of Ideological and Political Education Subjects
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    Abstract:
    Economics began to permeate through other disciplines in 1990s.This paper is trial to introducing externality,a concept in economics,into ideological and political education.The paper discusses the formation of externality of the behaviors of ideological and political education subjects,and the performance of positive externality and negative externality.
    Keywords:
    Externality
    Political Education
    The rigidity of the right model posits that psychological needs for security and certainty (NSC) attract people to a broad right-wing ideology that includes both sociocultural and economic political attitudes. We review evidence that NSC characteristics do not consistently predict economically right-wing preferences and propose the Menu-Independent and -Dependent Influence (MIDI) model as an alternative account of disposition-politics relations. In this model, NSC naturally attracts people to socioculturally conservative attitudes, but its effects on economic attitudes are the net outcome of potentially competing dispositional and discursive influences. We review evidence in support of the MIDI model and discuss its implications for understanding the interplay of background characteristics, social context, and political conflict.
    Disposition
    Certainty
    Citations (75)
    Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate that restricting the set of admissible institutionalized beliefs is central to the way in which game theory facilitates the study of endogenous institutions. Durkheim (1950 [1895], p. 45) recognized the centrality of institutionalized beliefs, arguing that institutions are “all the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the collectivity.” But neither Durkheim nor his followers placed any analytic restrictions on what beliefs the collectivity could institute. Because beliefs are not directly observable, however, deductively restricting them, as game theory lets us do, is imperative. The only beliefs that can be instituted by the collectivity – that can be common knowledge – are those regarding equilibrium (self-enforcing) behavior. Furthermore, the behavior that these beliefs motivate should reproduce, not refute or erode them.
    The main objective of this paper is to point out and to analyze different meanings and different aspects of 'social (in)equalities', depending on three levels of sociological analysis: the most abstract ideological level, concerning general, socially accepted or imposed social values, ideas and objectives; the second normative and political level at which social values and objectives are operationalized and, on the other hand, at which different and opposite social norms may provoke social conflicts (for instance, conflict between social laws forbidding monopoly behavior and violation of free competition, on the one hand, and some norms of big corporations that favor monopoly behavior, on the other hand); the third level of social practice, of everyday social life. The most important conclusions of the sociological analysis of social inequalities in the former socialist society are the following: (a) the principle of remuneration according to work is much more ideological norm of socialist society, while the more effective, functional norm is the principle of general economic and social security (employment of all persons capable to work, salaries regardless of work results and so on); (b) it is necessary to make clear distinction between the wrong and ineffective egalitarian norm tending to equalize social power of all employed persons and the right, effective egalitarian norm favoring equal rights of all employed persons to participate in decision making in the former system of socialist self-management. According to empirical results of several sociological researches, in the former Yugoslav society a kind of mixture of four value orientations prevailed: principle of socialist remuneration was primarily an ideological and political declaration; more effective (functional) principle of general economic and social security of all citizens was dominant; inclination toward libertarian principle of equal social chances was subdued, and even less present was acceptance of the principle of equal political rights and political equalities.
    Sociological Theory
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    In this paper, we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods, some of which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a two-way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generates the possibility of indeterminacies and multiple self-fulfilling equilibrium paths in cultural change and politics. We provide then a rationale for ideologies and collective socialization institutions as coordination mechanisms allowing cultural groups to preserve or shift political power in favor of their preference profile in the long run.
    Socialization
    Causality
    Political socialization
    Majority Rule
    Citations (3)
    Scholars in economics, political science, and sociology use various definitions of the term institution. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this chapter define the term in a precise manner in order to delineate the scope of the analysis. Particular rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations are central to this definition, which helps illuminate why institutions have such a profound impact on behavior and how they should be studied analytically (Part II), why they persist in a changing environment and why they exert an independent impact on institutional dynamics (Part III), and how to study them empirically (Part IV).
    Institution
    Scope (computer science)
    All over the world, people are prevented from participating fully in society through mechanisms that go beyond the structural and institutional barriers identified by rational choice theory (poverty, exclusion by law or force, taste-based and statistical discrimination, and externalities from social networks). This essay discusses four additional mechanisms that bounded rationality can explain: (i) implicit discrimination, (ii) self-stereotyping and self-censorship, (iii) ?fast thinking? adapted to underclass neighborhoods, and (iv)adaptive preferencesin which an oppressed group views its oppression as natural or even preferred. Stable institutions have cognitive foundations -- concepts, categories, social identities, and worldviews -- that function like lenses through which individuals see themselves and the world. Abolishing or reforming a discriminatory institution may have little effect on these lenses. Groups previously discriminated against by law or policy may remain excluded through habits of the mind. Behavioral economics recognizes forces of social exclusion left out of rational choice theory, and identifies ways to overcome them. Some interventions have had very consequential impact.
    Bounded rationality
    Social Exclusion
    Oppression
    Statistical discrimination
    Underclass
    Externality
    Citations (3)
    Ideological and political education is the process of mutual adaptation and mutual transcendence that is included in the interaction between educator and the educated.This article attempts to explain it with graphics.In the process of ideological and political education,the factors that can affect the educators' degree of satisfaction include educators' satisfaction and motivation,while the impacts on the educated come from the incentives and the satisfaction of needs.Usually,degrees of satisfaction for both educators and the educated can form a continuous curve of utility separately,and only when these two curves are tangent,can the utility of both be maximized,and the effects of ideological and political education be more effective.
    Affect
    Political Education
    Transcendence (philosophy)
    Citations (0)
    This paper develops a theory in which heterogeneity in political preferences produces a partisan disagreement about objective facts. A political decision involving both idiosyncratic preferences and scientific knowledge is considered. Voters form motivated beliefs in order to improve their subjective anticipation of the future political outcome. In equilibrium, they tend to deny the scientific arguments advocating the political orientations that run counter to their interests. Collective denial is the strongest in societies where contingent policy is the least likely to be implemented, either because of voters' intrinsic preferences or because of rigidities in the political process. The theory predicts that providing mixed evidence produces a temporary polarization of beliefs, but that disclosing unequivocal information eliminates the disagreement.
    Motivated reasoning
    Denial
    Anticipation (artificial intelligence)
    Political process
    Citations (5)