Political Connections, Types of Political Connections and Accounting Conservatism of Private Listed Companies
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Based on modification of Basu (1997) model, this paper examines the effect of political connection types, which consist of government officials connections and members of People's Congress (PC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) connections, on accounting conservatism in the private listed companies. The results confirm that political connections in private listed companies reduce accounting conservatism as a whole. After distinguishing the types of political connections, it is showed that members of PC and CPPCC connections reduce accounting conservatism, whereas government officials connections have no significant effect on accounting conservatism.Keywords:
Conservatism
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This article focuses on the collective members of political parties. Collective members can be defined as organizations having both full self-government rights and entitlements to decision-making processes in the political parties in which they are embedded. This article proposes a basic descriptive typology of collective members that takes into consideration their sociopolitical nature (party political or functional) and their pattern of articulation within the party in which they are embedded (whether they help to articulate the whole party structure or not). It also illustrates these subtypes by examining European organizations that meet (or are close to meeting) the main defining characteristics of collective members. This examination is based on the analysis of all parties that attained at least 4% of the votes in the last national parliamentary elections in 10 European countries. The article concludes with an analysis of the determinants and prospects of this type of party structure.
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Abstract Research on the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative in Brazil has generated a voluminous literature that sheds important light on our understanding of the policy-making process in Brazil and the relationship between the Executive and the political parties in Congress. However, little is known about how the bureaucracy is used as a tool for political patronage and its overall role in the policy-making. We aim to advance the understanding of this phenomena by studying which factors explain the distribution of political appointee positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy among political parties. By using an unique panel dataset and applying an One-Way Random Effects GLS regression model we found that the number of seats a party has in the lower Chamber, the party’s appointment of a cabinet minister, and being from the same party as the president’s (formateur party) play a fundamental role at explaining why some parties are more able to fill political appointees’ positions with their party members in the bureaucracy than others. These findings lend credence to the idea that appointments in the Brazilian bureaucracy can be better understood as “coalition goods” (by establishing an exchange baseline between the partisent’s party and the parties in the coalition) instead of “exchange goods” (as tools that help cover the ongoing costs of holding together the coalition).
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The connections between political parties and civil society are central to parties' representative performance. Several explanations exist for cross-party variations in the strength of these connections. However, nobody has compared the explanatory power of rival theories. This article does just that, using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries. It establishes that elites in parties with government experience and a left-wing ideological orientation have the strongest links to civil society. Parties at the far right are the least connected, in particular those that have no governing experience. Contrary to expectations, however, the study shows that, when controlling for party ideology and governing experience, the level of intra-party democracy and key components of party trajectory, such as party origin and strategy, are not significant in explaining the strength of party-society connections.Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: 10.1080/01402382.2021.1986784
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Investigations into Central Europe’s emerging party–state relationships—in contrast to those of the former Soviet Union—have focused less on the abuse of public office for private gain and more on patronage and clientelism as political resources. That debate in turn has been bounded by the conventional political science preoccupation with civil society, party, and state relations. This article contends that these conventions have tended to deflect our attention from the contemporary dynamics of political corruption in Central Europe, in which the commercial sector is a major player and the gains of political players primarily private. Building on the assumption that party systemic adaptations are contingent on changing power relations within the political economy, this article offers an ideal typical party model to characterise the behaviour of political parties that preside over the continuous marketization of the state. A “corporate brokerage party” directs its strategic focus to the private sector and acts primarily as a broker of the state’s power in the marketplace, whether expressed through privatisation, regulation, or public procurement. Using the Czech Republic as a critical case study for Central Europe, the evidence suggests that politicians able to direct allocation to the private sector with low regulatory constraints act less evidently as technocratic brokers of the public interest, partisan constituency, or organisation builders and more as private agents.
Clientelism
Technocracy
Marketization
Corporatism
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Politicians and political parties compete, just as do firms. There is division of opinion about the consequences of this. Some think this gives voters the policies and management of these policies that they want, just as competition between firms is thought to deliver products they want at the lowest possible costs of producing them. Thus, Joseph Schumpeter (1950) writes:
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Political party finance law is the set of norms governing the income and expenses of political parties. While many countries have addressed political party finance constitutionally, such provisions are usually phrased in general terms, such as requirements of transparency, leaving the details to law and to the regulations promulgated by enforcement agencies. Legal reforms to political party finance systems are not a panacea; but when written and implemented well, the legal framework can help address significant challenges that face political party systems. Political party finance law can be divided into five basic design areas: the provision of public funds to parties and campaigns; limits on party income; limits on party spending; disclosure of party finances to the public; and enforcement of political party finance laws. These five key areas are intersected by cross-cutting themes, which must be considered throughout: whether party finance rules operate on an ongoing basis, on an electoral campaign basis, or both; whether party finance rules operate at the national, regional and local levels of party organization, or only at some of these; the role of actors who are not parties or candidates; the use of state resources by parties in power; and the importance of incentivizing compliance with party finance rules. This report applies comparative and academic research on political party finance law to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with a focus on Egypt, Libya and Tunisia as post-authoritarian states that are currently engaged in comprehensive reform of their political institutions and are utilizing examples from other newer and more established democracies.
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Empirically, the aim of this thesis is to understand how national party dynamics
determine legislative behaviour in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. Through
a case study of the 60th Congress (2006-2009), I sought to identify the informal
rules that the parties have locked in for determining appointments to legislative
committees and the Directive Board. The first part of the case study overviews
the historical evolution of political parties in Mexico and shows how these have
adopted the behaviours and strategies that affect their performance in Congress.
This is complemented with an empirical description of the Chamber, its rules
and the organisation of party groups in the 60th Congress, which presents a
clear picture of how parties create informal rules and lock them in. The case
study ends with a quantitative analysis of background information of 440
members of the 60th Congress, showing that parties have a tight control over
political careers, facilitated by the existence of term limits and the political
careerism that characterises the political elite. I conclude that the Mexican
political system has been shaped by the three main parties to suit their interests,
thereby undermining the quality of democracy. Following the theoretical
precepts of historical institutionalism, this research claims that Mexican
institutions emerge and change through collective agreements of actors, who are
responsible for making institutional paths dependent. I argue that path
dependency in Mexico is conditional, in that elites have been willing to make
some institutional changes but not others, depending on the extent to which
creating new rules has a negative impact on their power. An innovative view of
path dependency, this finding is the main theoretical contribution of my work,
complemented by contributions to party and legislative organisation theories
with aims at explaining legislative parties’ behaviour in imperfect institutional
settings.
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This article analyses and quantifies the influence that the political party ruling the regional government has upon the economic performance of the corresponding public service broadcaster. An analysis of the economic performance of regional broadcasting companies was undertaken over the period from 1995 to 2016, studying variables such as expenses per employee, total expenses, total assets, ROA, assets turnover and total share; and their relationship with the political party ruling in the region. The correlation analysis, based on the Krukal-Wallis test, confirms the political parties' influence on the broadcasting entities' management approach. The results obtained indicate that there are significant differences in economic performance depending on the political party (Partido Popular, Spanish Socialist Workers Party and nationalist-regionalist parties) which governs the Autonomous Community, and suggest research areas of interest in order to examine in greater detail the impact of these parties in each case.
Empirical Research
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Maximization
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Grassroots
Civil Society
Intermediary
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Assertion
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