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    Moral Obligation and God
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    This chapter examines the doctrines of atonement found in Edwards's theology and that of his immediate disciple, Joseph Bellamy, the progenitor of the New Divinity governmental model of atonement. The chapter argues that in developing their own position, the New England theologians did not deviate from Edwardsian theology. Rather, they fused certain elements within a basically Edwardsian scheme, particularly emphasis on the moral government of God in creation, to forge a novel account of the work of Christ. In other words, they innovated within a theological tradition. The resulting account of the work of Christ is worthy of much more serious consideration in the academic literature than it has hitherto enjoyed.
    Divinity
    Atonement
    One of the things for which C. Stephen Evans is best known is his excellent work on Kierkegaard. Though references to Kierkegaard in this new book are fairly scant, they occur here and there. In the concluding section, for instance, Evans quotes the Danish philosopher's striking assertion that there ‘has never been an atheist, even though there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to let what they know (that the God exists) get control over their minds’ (quoted on p. 183). Evans interprets this assertion, in the light of the argument presented in his book, to mean that those who are aware of their moral obligations ‘have a kind of de re knowledge of God’, since awareness of one's moral obligations simply is awareness of God's commands (p. 183). That is, in a nutshell, the thesis for which the book argues: that ‘moral obligation’ and ‘divine command’ are merely two terms for ‘the same reality’ (p. 28).
    Assertion
    Moral obligation
    Argument (complex analysis)
    Obligation
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    This chapter looks at the issue of the normative significance of moral requirements in the first-person perspective of deliberation. Moral conclusions are customarily treated as considerations that matter within an agent's practical decision-making. That a course of action would be impermissible, for instance, or morally the right thing to do, are conclusions that appear to have direct relevance for practical deliberation, which agents who are reasoning correctly will take appropriately into account in planning their future activities. The philosophical problem in this area is often understood to be the problem of making sense of the reason-giving force of morality. That is, an account of moral rightness or permissibility should shed light on the standing of these considerations as reasons for action, which count for and against actions in the first-person perspective of agency. However, this conventional understanding seriously underdescribes the challenge that faces a philosophical account of morality.
    Deliberation
    Relevance
    Obligation
    Moral obligation
    A widespread view among theists is that there is a moral obligation to obey God’s commands. In this paper, four arguments for this view are considered: the argument from beneficence; the argument from property rights; the argument from justice; and the argument from omnipotence and moral perfection. It is argued that none of these arguments succeeds in showing that there is a moral obligation to obey God’s commands. The paper concludes with the suggestion that there might be, nevertheless, weighty and specifically religious (as distinct from moral) reasons to obey God.
    Moral obligation
    Obligation
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    Analytic Philosophy
    Moral obligation
    Moral philosophy
    Obligation
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    Moral obligation
    Obligation
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