Delusions and the role of beliefs in perceptual inference

Journal Article Perceptual Belief and Psychological Explanation Get access Keith Quillen Keith Quillen Bates College, Lewiston Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 156, July 1989, Pages 276–293, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220172 Published: 01 July 1989

BATES

10.2307/2220172

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Beliefs about emotions reflect cognitive biases

Routledge eBooks (2018)

Robert L. Leahy

10.4324/9780203711095-6

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Conspiracist beliefs, intuitive thinking, and schizotypal facets: A further evaluation

Applied Cognitive Psychology (2020)

Andrew Denovan Neil Dagnall Kenneth Drinkwater Andrew Parker Nick Neave

Summary This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship.

Cognitive style

Anhedonia

Need for cognition

Reality testing

10.1002/acp.3716

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Implications of the differences between our perceptual and conceptual views.

Psychology & Neuroscience (2016)

Steven Pashko

10.1037/pne0000055

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Some relationships between social inference, cognitive balance, and change in impression.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1973)

Harry F. Gollob Gregory W. Fischer

Impression formation

Impression

Impression management

Attitude Change

10.1037/h0034222

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A psychological study on vague judgments in social and perceptual tasks

Journal of Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Intelligent Informatics (2010)

Daiki Wakayama Takashi Ideno Kazuhisa Takemura

本研究では，曖昧な判断の性質を明らかにするために，社会的事象の判断課題と知覚判断課題の心理実験を行った．被験者は252人を概ね同じぐらいの３グループにランダムに割り当てた．３グループはそれぞれ，第１グループが正確に推定するように教示した正確教示条件，第２グループが「だいたいで」推定するように教示した曖昧教示条件，そして第３グループがファジィ評定法により推定するように教示したファジィ教示条件のもとで回答が得られた．その結果，５項目ある知覚判断課題中２項目（面積推定と縦線の長さ推定）において有意差が見られ，正確教示条件の方が曖昧教示条件よりも推定値は正確であるものの，残りの知覚判断課題３項目で正確教示条件と曖昧教示条件間で有意差は見られなかった．また，３項目ある社会的判断課題のひとつ（年間自殺者数推定）において有意差が見られ，正確教示条件よりも曖昧教示条件で得られた推定値の方が正確であるという逆の結果が得られた．しかし，他の社会的判断課題２項目（年間結婚件数と富士山の高さ）において，正確教示条件と曖昧教示条件間で有意差は見られなかった．本研究で得られた知見は，ある条件においては，曖昧な判断が必ずしも劣っているとはいえず，適応的であることを示唆するものである．

10.3156/jsoft.22.443

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