Considering Harm and Safety in Youth Mental Health: A Call for Attention and Action
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The possibility of harm from mental health provision, and in particular harm from youth mental health provision, has been largely overlooked. We contend that if we continue to assume youth mental health services can do no harm, and all that is needed is more services, we continue to risk the possibility that the safety of children and young people is unintentionally compromised. We propose a three level framework for considering harm from youth mental health provision (1. ineffective engagement, 2. ineffective practice and 3. adverse events) and suggest how this framework could be used to support quality improvement in services.Keywords:
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Abstract Feinberg addresses two questions. First, are bad Samaritan laws morally legitimate? He believes they are since it is important to avoid serious harm to personal interests, and persons in danger have a right to be saved by those who can do so without unreasonable risk. Second, does the harm principle cover blamable failure to prevent harm? Feinberg holds that requiring people to help prevent harm is sometimes as reasonable a legal policy as preventing people, by threat of punishment, from actively causing harm. This conclusion does not represent a departure from the harm principle, he argues, since, in some circumstances, omissions may cause harm.
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This contribution presents fi ndings from a qualitative study which focused on young urban professionals in the Philippines who work(ed) in international call centers – workplaces usually characterized by job insecurity and other forms of precarity, factory-like working conditions, and disembeddedness. Nevertheless, trade unions in these centers have not come into existence. Why collective action is not chosen by call center agents as an option to tackle the above mentioned problems – this is what the research project this article is based on tried to understand. After outlining some work related problems identifi ed by Filipino call center agents, the article will focus on the strategies the agents employ to counter these problems (mainly accommodation and everyday resistance). By highlighting fi ve objective and fi ve subjective reasons (or reasons by circumstances and reasons by framing), we conclude that it is not repressive regulation policies, but rather the formative power and the internalization of discourses of rule within individual life strategies that are preventing the establishment of unions and other collective action structures.
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Abstract This chapter defends a restricted aggregationist view about harm prevention. Restricted aggregationist views claim that preventing an aggregation of smaller harms to many people can justify failing to save a smaller number of people from larger harms in cases where the difference between the harms is not too great. The view defended here is that even if preventing an aggregation of smaller harms cannot justify failing to save a person from a much larger harm by counting against preventing the larger harm, they can justify the decision not to save a person from a much larger harm by counterbalancing other reasons there might be to save the person from a much larger harm. This view is shown to be preferable to a more familiar restricted aggregationist view, where the prevention of smaller harms makes no contribution to the decision not to save a person from a larger harm at all.
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In previous anti-dumping cases, the authorities concerned only apply the first criterion to confirm the dumping harm. It is rarely seen that the second and the third criteria are applied. The paper, by examining the relevant ani-dumping cases, attempts to discuss the application of the second criterion-the threat of material harm-in determining dumping harm in anti-dumping practices.
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This paper defends what I call the ‘wellbeing conception of harm’, according to which the relevant criterion for determining whether one has suffered harm is whether they have been made worse off in terms of their wellbeing. Firstly, I explain why it is that one might find the wellbeing conception of harm appealing to begin with. Then, I respond to two sets of concerns that have been levied against the wellbeing conception of harm. The first set of concerns relate to the implausible moral/political consequences that would allegedly follow from adopting the wellbeing conception of harm. The second set of concerns challenge the practical significance of adopting the wellbeing conception of harm. I conclude with some remarks on how the wellbeing conception of harm can help to answer, or at least navigate, some controversial issues related to harm.
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The need to control violent and non-violent harm has been central to human existence since societies first emerged. This book analyses the problem of harm in world politics which stems from the fact that societies require the power to harm in order to defend themselves from internal and external threats, but must also control the capacity to harm so that people cannot kill, injure, humiliate or exploit others as they please. Andrew Linklater analyses writings in moral and legal philosophy that define and classify forms of harm, and discusses the ways in which different theories of international relations suggest the power to harm can be controlled so that societies can co-exist with the minimum of violent and non-violent harm. Linklater argues for new connections between the English School study of international society and Norbert Elias' analysis of civilizing processes in order to advance the study of harm in world politics.
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Abstract Many activities impose risks of harm on other people. One such class of risks are those that individuals culpably impose on others, such as the risk arising from reckless driving. Do such risks in themselves constitute a harm, over and above any harm that actually eventuates? This paper considers three recent views that each answer in the affirmative. I argue that each fails to overcome what I call the ‘interference objection’. The risk of harm itself, whether taken as a subjective or an objective risk, is unable to interfere with the interests of victims in order to constitute a harm. This does not mean that a risk of harm cannot itself be wrongful, but the conclusion does weaken the moral objectionableness of impositions of risks of harm.
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