The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
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Bisection
Value (mathematics)
Combinatorial auction
English auction
The Ministry of Finance changed in 2004 the treasury auction mechanism from the uniform-price auction to hybrid auction.In this article,the author used the reduced-form analysis method to compare the effects of uniform-price auction and hybrid auction with data from the Ministry.Our goal is to find out if there is any difference between the two auction mechanisms in terms of bid competition and auction revenue.
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Prevenient studies in auction procedure are staying on one-stage auction.This paper attempt to prove whether auction by stages can bring higher return using Symmetric independent private value model and finally approved this result.Much of the return increase is that seller hold more bidders information thereby he can make feasible reserve price.Stages auction can be applied to all areas sealed-bid first price auction can be applied.
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This dissertation consists of three essays covering applications of auction design. The first essay analyzes a model where a number of objects is sold in sequential second-price auctions. Each bidder has a privately known discount factor by which his valuation for an object decreases in each auction. The main result shows that prices decline in the sequence of auctions, even if corrected for the decrease in valuations. This result can explain the declining price anomaly and the afternoon effect. The second essay deals with impatience on the buyer's side and analyzes a Dutch auction, where the buyers' valuations decline while the auction runs. It turns out that the optimal behavior for the seller is either to run a very slow or a very fast auction. In a slow auction bidders do not find it profitable to wait and the auction is equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In the fast auction the time preferences become less important and the auction becomes a sealed-bid-first-price auction. When comparing the expected revenue of the Dutch auction with that of a Japanese auction (with impatient buyers), the Japanese auction turns out to be better for the seller. The third essay analyzes a procurement auction where a firm plans to buy one of two different items. An auction format is described where the auction not only determines the price but also which item to procure. The auction is designed with practical applications in mind, i.e. it focuses on additive handicaps for bids the on less valued item.
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Vickrey auction has its comparative advantages [1] in economic perspectives. In second price sealed-bid auction, bidderspsila bidding strategies are not affected by closing method. In a first-price auction, bidders always bid below their values. In year 2007, author proposed one round first price anonymous auction protocol [2] to solve the tie problem in one round auction. This paper is to extend the one round anonymous auction protocol from first price to second price auction protocol.
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We report on the experimental results of simple auctions with (i) a median-bid pricing rule and (ii) bid cancellation allowed – the two central pillars of the competitive bidding program designed by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Comparisons between the performance of the CMS auction and the performance of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, an auction with wellknown theoretical properties, reveals the problematic nature of the CMS auction. The CMS auction fails to produce competitive prices of goods and fails to satisfy demand. In all proposed efficiency measures, we find the VCG mechanism significantly outperforms the CMS auction.
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The repeated nature of sponsored search auctions allows the seller to implement Myerson’s auction to maximize revenue using past data. But since these data are provided by strategic buyers in the auctions, they can be manipulated, which may hurt the seller’s revenue. We model this problem as a Private Data Manipulation (PDM) game: the seller first announces an auction (such as Myerson’s) whose allocation and payment rules depend on the value distributions of buyers; the buyers then submit fake value distributions to the seller to implement the auction. The seller’s expected revenue and the buyers’ expected utilities depend on the auction rule and the game played among the buyers in their choices of the submitted distributions. Under the PDM game, we show that Myerson’s auction is equivalent to the generalized first-price auction, and under further assumptions equivalent to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction and the generalized second-price auction. Our results partially explain why Myerson’s auction is not as popular as the generalized second-price auction in the practice of sponsored search auctions, and provide new perspectives into data-driven decision making in mechanism design.
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This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the competition for procurement contracts under different auction procedures. One procedure is a "discriminatory" auction in which contractors simultaneously submit sealed bids, and the lowest bidder wins. The other procedure is a "competitive" auction in which the bid price is lowered sequentially until only one interested bidder remains. The focus is on the effect of changes in procurement procedures and the number of bidders on expected procurement costs. If bidders in this model are risk averse, then the expected procurement cost is lower in a discrimatory auction than in a competitive auction.
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As the rapid development of e-commerce, online auction has taken more and more proportion in the business. In online auction, bidders bid for a good on the Internet, which makes it difficult to find and bound the bidders' action, so cheating, say shilling by the seller, has become a popularity in online auction. Because it is so easy for a seller to bid in an online auction, then how to resist shill in online auction has become a problem worth studying. This paper solves this problem by studying the seller's shill bidding strategies in English auction, first-price sealed auction and second-price sealed auction, and it focuses attention on environment where bidders' evaluation of the good is independent private information. The result shows that if the online auction is an auction of second-price sealed auction, the seller's shill bid is equivalent to the seller's reserve price. Thus if the online auction is a second-price sealed auction, then it is not profitable for the seller to bid a shill price, so the seller will not engage in shill bidding. Because second-price sealed auction is not an auction which can easily be understood by the bidder, the paper gives some propositions on how to hold a second-price sealed auction on the Internet.
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The second price auction has been the prevalent auction format used by advertising exchanges because of its simplicity and desirable incentive properties. However, even with an optimized choice of reserve prices, this auction is not revenue optimal when the bidders are heterogeneous and their valuation distributions differ significantly. In order to optimize the revenue of advertising exchanges, we propose an auction format called the boosted second price auction, which assigns a boost value to each bidder. The auction favors bidders with higher boost values and allocates the item to the bidder with the highest boosted bid. We propose a data-driven approach to optimize boost values using the previous bids of the bidders. Our analysis of auction data from Google's online advertising exchange shows that the boosted second price auction with data-optimized boost values outperforms the second price auction and empirical Myerson auction by up to 6% and 3%, respectively.
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When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.
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