logo
    The Global Impact of ITAR on the For-Profit and Non-Profit Space Communities
    2
    Citation
    11
    Reference
    20
    Related Paper
    Citation Trend
    Abstract:
    Under the United States Arms Export Control Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) control the export of technologies that are specified as defense articles on the United States Munitions List (USML). The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the Department of State (DoS) interprets and enforces these regulations in an effort to safeguard national security by denying advanced military technology to potential competitors.
    Keywords:
    Competitor analysis
    Safeguard
    For profit
    Abstract : Armed forces all over the world need military equipment to support their security missions. Having a domestic defense industry is one approach that countries use to supply their armed forces requirements. The successful development of a domestic defense industry depends on many factors, but perhaps the most significant variable is the government. Because governments are both buyers and suppliers of national security, government policies are often designed by governments to defend and regulate domestic defense industries. This professional report explores the substance costs and benefits of various government policies to establish a sustainable defense industry. The report focuses on government policies in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and South Korea, because defense industries in those countries have proven track records and tend to be profitable and sustainable.
    Defense industry
    Defence industry
    Citations (0)
    Abstract : This paper suggests an approach for how the Department of Defense (DoD) might execute deep reductions in the defense budget, deep enough that stated defense strategy could not be fully resourced. The cuts examined go beyond the $487 billion announced in January 2012 by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. The authors do not argue for or against further reductions. They posit that the ongoing pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit may mandate further reductions in the DoD budget. In this context, they suggest starting from a strategic basis in determining the reductions, prioritizing challenges, and identifying where to accept more risk in the process. The paper demonstrates this method with three illustrative strategic directions that might guide the department in choosing which forces and programs to reduce or to protect while making explicit the risks involved. It builds on the strategic guidance of January 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.1 It is intended to inform the debate that will likely take place over the coming months, and years, on how to cope with pressure to reduce the defense budget further while limiting risk to U.S. national security. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.
    Combatant
    Limiting
    Mandate
    Military Strategy
    Citations (2)
    Abstract : Contents: Describe the genesis of what has become known as the Critical Technology Approach to the control of exports of U.S. technology; Discuss some of the actions taken by DoD in the past few years to provide for more effective controls on the export of technology with significant military value; Discuss the present status of our work in developing the Critical Technology Approach to controlling the export of U.S. technology; and Provide a prognosis of the next steps in the implementation of the Critical Technology Approach which will highlight some of the relevant issues.
    Military technology
    Technology policy
    Citations (2)
    Essential features of the recommendations are to (1) replace licensing of low-risk individual transactions with programmatic approvals; (2) establish timelines for decisions on those items that still require licenses; (3) streamline the munitions list through annual reviews; and (4) harmonize national and multilateral lists to eliminate jurisdictional disputes.
    Time line
    Arms Control
    Citations (0)
    Abstract : Within the Department of Defense, the military services are working with the Defense Technology Security Administration and other offices to develop and implement effective and practical controls on advanced technologies. DoD has proposed and has collaborated with the Dept. of Commerce to establish a certified end-users system for granting export licenses that will ease greatly the burden of exporting to reliable foreign firms. DoD has made technology security a central element in agreements with our allies on the Strategic Defense Initiative and on other cooperative programs in military technology. The United States, the other NATO nations and Japan continue to revise the COCOM (coordinating Committee on Export Controls) control list and to negotiate with non-COCOM countries for the protection of Western technology. One measure of our success is that COCOM has not licensed a single new turnkey factory for the production of sensitive goods to the Soviet Union in the past five years. In the next five years, our efforts in technology security will be primarily consolidation and further institutional development. In the coming half decade we must reinforce a proven program, making it even more effective and efficient. Here at home we must complete the automation of the export control system. DoD has used automation to reduce greatly the time for reviewing applications for export licenses.
    Citations (0)
    Abstract : This Note was prepared for the project, 'New Realities in the Global Arms Trade,' sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This research was undertaken by the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. This Note should be of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with Third World and Chinese arms production and arms sales.
    Citations (9)
    As a sovereign nation, Indonesia has a strategy to defend itself against threats from outside and within the country. That requires a strong defense, both in terms of the number of military personnel and the number of defense equipment. So far, we have mostly the weaponry purchased and hung from abroad. This paper discusses the results of the study several policies and government regulations in defense and securi-ty in Indonesia. The methodology used is the start of data collection both primary data and secondary data, and from these data calculated the ideal number of military personnel and defense equipment. From the analysis of the data can be identified that one of the obstacles faced by Indonesian defense is the ratio of the number of military personnel to the personnel composition of the population as well as Army, Navy, and Air Force are still not ideal as well as the number of defense equipment owned is but below standard. In addition, the documents are not MP3EI clear roadmap on the development, engineering, and purchases of defense equipment and targets each year. Another problem is the absence of good coordination on defense research consortium activities. For that recommended the need for cooperation between military R & D, universities, and other research institutions under one umbrella defense research resulting in better research synergy.
    Citations (0)
    Abstract : The U.S. International Trade in Armaments Regulations (ITAR) regime is a major national security and public policy issue. Exploring the ITAR environment through a set of case studies was the central idea in a project involving participants at Cranfield University (UK) and the Naval Postgraduate School. Our colleagues investigated the effects of ITAR within the ongoing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, which involves the United States and a number of international partners, including the UK. The Cranfield report (under separate cover) was based on a survey of UK stakeholders. The results were unambiguous and striking. Our British partners concluded that ITAR was a good idea gone horribly awry. Section II provides a summary. Our main interest (Section III) is the F/A-18 tactical fighter program, which eventually involved many international partners. This collaboration was highly successful and was managed to the general satisfaction of the parties involved. It was, in short, a significantly different outcome within the ITAR regime. An introduction (Section I) provides a brief overview of ITAR and illustrates the reasons for its being controversial. Finally, our concluding section summarizes the Obama Administration's initiative to reform ITAR, and offers some questions for further research in export controls in the global defense marketplace.
    Section (typography)
    Citations (0)
    The Defense Production Act (DPA) was created at the outset of the Korean War to ensure the availability of the nation's industrial resources to meet the national security needs of the United States by granting the President powers to ensure the supply and timely delivery of products, materials, and services to military and civilian agencies. The DPA codifies a robust legal authority given the president to force industry to give priority to national security production and is the statutory underpinning of governmental review of foreign investment in U.S. companies. Since its enactment in 1950, the DPA has been time-limited, undergoing periodic amendment and reauthorization. In 2003, Congress reauthorized the DPA through September 30, 2008.
    Scope (computer science)
    Underpinning
    Citations (5)
    Congress has authorized billions of dollars for new security cooperation programs since 2001 to meet an ever-widening set of national security challenges. This report analyzes the obstacles that the Department of Defense faces in tracking its spending on security cooperation activities and recommends ways to streamline its reporting process to meet new requirements for transparency imposed by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.
    Citations (4)