Advances in array languages
25
Citation
25
Reference
10
Related Paper
Citation Trend
A new algorithm and a new public-key cryptosystem based on Dickson polynomials was given, which can re-place LUC public-key cryptosystem. This new public-key cryptosystem has the same level of security as the LUC and has less calculation than LUC’s.
Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem
Plaintext-aware encryption
Threshold cryptosystem
Cite
Citations (1)
The author shows that the Cao-Li cryptosystem proposed in is not secure. Its private key can be reconstructed from its public key using elementary means such as LU-decomposition and the Euclidean algorithm.
Euclidean algorithm
Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem
Cite
Citations (1)
It is shown how a chosen-public-key attack can compromise the ID-based cryptosystem of S. Tsujii and T. Itoh (1989), as well as most of the existing public-key cryptosystems. The authors present a scheme which can withstand the chosen-public-key attack, based on the concept of an cryptosystem. The security of the scheme is equivalent to factoring the product of two large primes or solving the discrete logarithm problem. It enciphers data using the receiver's ID directly without the help of a third party.< >
Discrete logarithm
Factoring
Cite
Citations (1)
Cite
Citations (107)
Cite
Citations (11)
A novel ID-based cryptographic scheme for implementing a public-key cryptosystem and signature is proposed. Instead of generating and publishing a public key for each user, the ID-based scheme permits each user to choose his/her name or network address as his/her public key. This eliminates the needs of a large public field and the exchange of private or public keys. The major advantage of the ID-based cryptosystem based on this scheme over other published ID-based cryptosystems is that the number of users can be extended to t*L users without degrading the system's security even when users conspire, where L is the number of the system's secrets, and t is the number of factors in p-1, where p is a large prime number.< >
Signature (topology)
Threshold cryptosystem
Network address
Cite
Citations (3)
We show that the Cao-Li cryptosystem proposed in \cite{CL1} is not secure. Its private key can be reconstructed from its public key using elementary means such as LU-decomposition and Euclidean algorithm.
Euclidean algorithm
Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem
Cite
Citations (1)
The manufacturer of an asymmetric backdoor for a public key cryptosystem manipulates the key generation process in such a way that he can extract the private key or other secret information from the user's public key by involving his own public/private key pair. All asymmetric backdoors in major public key cryptosystems including RSA differ substantially in their implementation approaches and in their quality in satisfying backdoor related properties like confidentiality and concealment. While some of them meet neither of these two properties very well, others provide a high level of confidentiality but none of them is concealing, which limits their use for covert implementation. In this paper we introduce two novel asymmetric RSA backdoors, both following the approach to embed bits of one of the RSA prime factors in the user's public RSA modulus. While our first backdoor provides confidentiality for a sufficiently large key length, it might be detected under certain circumstances. The second backdoor extends the first one such that it additionally provides concealment and is thus particularly suitable for covert implementation.
Backdoor
Covert
Key generation
Cite
Citations (4)
Discrete logarithm
Cite
Citations (2)