Shared Governance Equals Shared Decision, Is it or Is it Not?
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Businesses are scrutinized for causing major social, environmental, and economic problems while prospering at the expense of the both society and the environment. However, Elkington’s (1998) theory of the triple bottom line theorized a different way of operating. Elkington (1998) provided the primary argument that businesses must not only consider, but also balance the triple bottom lines.
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Argument (complex analysis)
Value (mathematics)
Creating shared value
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One major problem in global governance is the specification of decision-making rules for international and regional organisations to coordinate the states of the world. Various organisations use different decision-making rules, and the properties of these rules may be compared systematically in terms of the power index approach. The power index solution concept of N-person games may be employed to display a basic problem in global governance, namely, the fundamental trade-off between state veto on the one hand and the capacity of the organisation or groups of states to act, meaning its decisiveness, on the other hand. Thus, when states coordinate through the setting up and running of international organisations, they then face a trade-off between their own control over the organisation and the capacity of the organisation to act. States make this trade-off in different ways depending upon the nature of the international or regional organisation as they reflect upon what is most important, to wit, own control or the capacity of the group to act.
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Mandate
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Extending the dichotomous logic of centralization of strategic and decentralization of operational rights in the M-form structuring,we decompose the decision into six subclasses,i.e.,strategy,investment,human resource,finance,budget and operation;And then we run a multivariate analysis of variance on the allocation of multi-class decision between the parent company and its directly affiliated units in the104 central enterprise groups.We find out:①In these large state-owned enterprise groups,the allocation pattern of decision take shapes,in which important sub-class are centralized while less important sub-class decentralized.②There are no significant differences in the allocation of the sub-class between three organizational structures,i.e.,functional,multi-business and holding structures;However,there are significant differences in the allocation of the sub-class between different parent-subsidiary governance distances,especially in the allocation of budget and financial rights.③The parent-subsidiary governance distance exerts a significant moderate effect on the relationship between organizational structure and the allocation of sub-class rights,especially in the allocation of financial and investment rights.These results suggest that large enterprise groups should improve their abilities of corporate governance to facilitate the alignment between the allocation of decision and organizational structure.
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The past 40 years have witnessed quantum environmental changes, which have driven business organisations to constantly adopt and change so as to attain sustainability over time. The quest for survival entails the effort of every business organization to strike a delicate balance between environmental and organizational imperatives. These deep and continuous and many of times chaotic changes have propagated a number of novel organizational forms. The terms "network organization" have been used by researchers in some variety and without a clear consensus as to what they mean. Most of the scholarly research has focused on the dyadic relations on a network with a number of notable exceptions analyzing the network as a whole integrated entity and not its constituting organization. This paper analyzes the network organization on the network level and not on the organizational level. Consequently, and because of the lack of any formal mechanisms of coordination and control in a such entity, which conversely exists on the organizational level of analysis, the issue of network governance becomes very prevalent. In that respect, a number of different forms of governance are conveyed along with their differentiating characteristics and the extent to which a given network organization is governed by the participant organizations in the network collectively, by a participant in the network organization on the basis of its power, legitimacy etc in a highly centralized manner or by an external to the network organization entity established exactly for the specific purpose of governing the network. The successful adoption of a particular form of governance is founded on four key structural and relational presuppositions: trust, number of the organizations comprising the network, goal consensus and the nature of the task which determines the competence level required. A basic postulation is that when focusing on network – level analysis and outcomes, the governance form adopted is critical for explaining network effectiveness. Salient items in the research agenda may be the validation of the different forms of governance in conjunction with the contextual framework of operations, the determination and the relationship of the governance form selection criteria and the power symmetry among the participant organizations in the network.
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Abstract This chapter examines the shared compensation and decision making practices with evidence from the American labor market using the nationally representative 1994–1995 Freeman-Rogers Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) for the United States and the 2003 California Establishment Survey (CES). The WRPS focuses on employee involvement and work organization but also asks about the mode of compensation so that we can link compensation systems and employee decision making. The CES surveys businesses on compensation and decision-making practices, and has productivity-related outcomes that allow examination of the relation between firm performance and compensation and decision-making systems. Shared compensation is stated to be positively associated with shared decision making, and that combining shared compensation systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes than the systems separately.
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Executive compensation
Representation
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Economic rent
Value (mathematics)
Creating shared value
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Closure (psychology)
Presupposition
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We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance.We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a“team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however,that for many of the most important governance decisions there is, in fact, no hierarchy. In those cases, governance emerges from an intertwined series of market transactions. To use the nomenclature of Blair and Stout, there are many players, but there is no coach, and thus, no “team.” Rather, the firm is controlled by a series of relationships—some of which are governed within the firm and some of which are governed and enforced externally. Ours, then, is a true Coasean framework, suggesting that important implications arise when we differentiate cases where the value of market discipline on stakeholders exceeds the large transaction costs that could be reduced by integration or team creation from cases where the opposite is true. We provide some preliminary conclusions on those implications.
Corporation
Coase theorem
Value (mathematics)
Shareholder Value
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