Organizing Secrecy: The CIA and Institutional Control

2015 
Remember, we go where others never go! Charles E. Allen (CIA) Maintaining accountability of government agencies nestled within the executive branch has long been the concern of the two other branches of government. As will be discussed throughout this book, the accountability and control specifically of intelligence agencies have had a more intermittent trajectory, with the oversight mechanisms developing incrementally and with the public and decision makers both interested in intelligence matters only from time to time. The cycle of exposure of the intelligence agencies tends to be very public during national crises, with accusations requiring that deeply secretive individuals come forth at these moments of perceived failure. Recent examples of this cycle include multiple testimonies by DNI James Clapper in front of the intelligence oversight committees; NSA Director General Keith B. Alexander called to testify on domestic surveillance on U.S. persons, as well as on European politicians and private citizens; and an angry speech by Senator Dianne Feinstein about the CIA's behavior regarding a lengthy report on the Agency's detention and interrogation program. Prior to this, there were ample other examples of top-level officials called into Congress to explain the use of drones, enhanced interrogation techniques, and black sites. The 9/11 Commission hearings brought heads of agencies, administration officials, and other experts forward to answer for their decisions that apparently failed to stop the terrorist attacks. Beyond this, there are lasting television images of Oliver North testifying about Iran-Contra in the 1980s, as well as photos of Senator Frank Church holding a dart gun, allegedly used by the CIA during testimony provided to his Senate investigatory committee in 1975. When there is not a public scandal or operational failure, intelligence agencies and their work tend to fade into the national background. This dynamic creates not only a complex and varied relationship between the intelligence agencies and overseers, but also contributes to an off-kilter sense of intelligence identity and culture among the public.
    • Correction
    • Cite
    • Save
    • Machine Reading By IdeaReader
    0
    References
    0
    Citations
    NaN
    KQI
    []