Epistemological Anarchism and How Science Works

It is well known that most of Feyerabend’s ideas on epistemological anarchism developed as a constant dialogue with Imre Lakatos (cf. Motterlini, 1999). Furthermore, in developing his ideas, Feyerabend was constantly critiquing both Karl Popper and Lakatos. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the debate between Feyerabend and Lakatos, here I present a brief description of the Lakatosian Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (MSRP). (I am grateful to David Geelan for this suggestion). According to Lakatos (1970) the basic unit of appraisal must not be an isolated theory or conjunction of theories but rather a “research program,” with a conventionally accepted “hard core” and with a “positive heuristic” which defines problems, outlines the construction of a “belt of auxiliary hypotheses,” foresees anomalies and turns them victoriously into examples, all according to a preconceived plan. The “negative heuristic” represents the “hard core” of the program, consisting of basic assumptions considered “irrefutable” by the methodological decision of its protagonists, and does not allow modus tollens to de directed at this hard core. The positive heuristic represents the construction of a “protective belt” consisting of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the “refutable variants” of the program. The positive heuristic saves the scientist from becoming confused in the “ocean of anomalies” by directing the modus tollens at the “auxiliary hypotheses”. The scientist lists anomalies, but as long as his research program sustains its momentum, he may freely put them aside, and it is primarily the positive heuristic of the program, and not the anomalies, which dictate the choice of problems.