A Brief Summary of the Papers in the Volume

In their Models for the Game of Liar’s Dice, Ferguson and Ferguson explicitly solve a multimove game of competition where a player must occasionally lie and the other must detect the lie. For example, player I first observes a random variable X( 1), having a continuous distribution function F(x). He then chooses Y(1) and claims that X(1) ≥ Y(1). Player n, must then challenge or accept player I’s claim. If he challenges, player I wins if and only if he was telling the truth. If II accepts the claim, then the game is played again with the roles of the players reversed. Independent of X(1), now player II observes X(2) from F(x), and claims X(2) ≥ Y(2) but this time Y(2) must be larger than Y(1). The game may be repeated indefinitely with the players reversing roles and the new call always being greater than the previous call. The value of this game is proved to be.