Nudging Enforcers: How Norm Perceptions and Motives for Lying Shape Sanctions

The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of two experiments, we examine how motives for lying and norm perceptions steer enforcement. Our contribution is to investigate the extent to which norm breaches are sanctioned, how norm-nudges affect the observed punishment behavior, and how the enforcement is linked to norm perceptions. Using a representative U.S. sample, Experiment 1 provides robust evidence that norm-enforcement is not only sensitive to the extent of the observed transgression (= size of the lie) but also to its consequences (= whether the lie remedies or creates payoff inequalities). We also find norm enforcers to be sensitive to different norm-nudges that convey social information about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. To explain the punishment patterns, Experiment 2 examines how norms are perceived across different transgressions and how norm-nudges change these perceptions. We observe a malleability of social norm perceptions: norm nudges are most effective when pre-existing norms are vague. Importantly, we also find that punishment patterns in the first experiment closely follow these norm perceptions. Our findings suggest that norm enforcement can be successfully nudged and thus represent an expedient alternative to standard incentive-based interventions.