Pricing Mechanism Design for Data Offloading in Ultra-Dense LEO-Based Satellite-Terrestrial Networks

In this paper, we consider an ultra-dense LEO-based satellite-terrestrial network where the traditional operator (TO) cannot satisfy the increasing data demand of its subscribed users due to the limited backhaul capacity of traditional small cells. Therefore, the TO offloads its users to LEO-based small cells owned by the satellite operator (SO) for satellite-backhauled network access. To motivate both operators for data offloading and maximize their revenues, we propose a pricing mechanism for data offloading based on the Stackelberg game. An iterative optimization algorithm framework is developed by jointly considering user association, Ka-band spectrum allocation and pricing to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium. The user association scheme and pricing scheme to maximize the TO and the SO's revenues are designed separately. The closed-form optimal solution for user association problem is derived, and the iterative pricing mechanism is also designed. Simulation results show that our proposed pricing scheme can motivate two operators for offloading efficiently. The influence of frequency resources and the number of LEO satellites is also discussed.