Trust Degree can Preserve Community Structure on Co-evolving Complex Networks in Spatial Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Community structure is one of the most ubiquitous and important features of many real systems, such as social, economy and biology networks. In this paper, we study the evolutionary dynamics in the realm of a generalized prisoner’s dilemma game on network which exhibits community structure and power law degree distribution co-evolving with the strategies. In our game, each person can be a cooperator, a defector or a super cooperator. A super cooperator is a cooperator who trusts other people much more than the normal one. During the evolution, when the expectation payoff is below a certain value, a link between the player and one of its neighbors will be broken and rewired to a cooperator or a super cooperator on network. Our results point out that lower trust degree can break the community structure of the network and inhibit the emergence of cooperation.