Resilient multivariable perimeter control of urban road networks under cyberattacks

Abstract The Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) concept has become a very valuable tool for modeling the aggregated dynamic of large-scale urban traffic networks. This advance in traffic modeling has fueled the development of many urban traffic control (UTC) policies based on the MFD concept. In particular, perimeter control policies with the aim of maintaining a large-scale urban traffic network operating at its maximum capacity by manipulating the transfer flow of vehicles between adjacent homogeneous regions. In addition to achieve a satisfactory performance level, it is desirable that the control system would maintain a reliable operation under unanticipated events such as cyberattacks. It is important to note that modern UTC systems extensively rely on information technology infrastructures making them vulnerable to cyberattacks. Due to the occurrence of real-world cyberattacks affecting controlled physical systems in different fields, the threat of cyberattacks is becoming a serious and increasing concern for the proper operation of UTC. This paper presents a resilient multivariable control framework for large-scale urban traffic networks subject to several types of cyberattacks such as deception attacks and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Additionally, a feedforward–feedback control scheme combining a time-optimal controller with the resilient multivariable controller is also proposed. The aim of this feedforward–feedback controller is to steer the accumulations to their desired values after a large deviation. Finally, the performance of the proposed resilient controller is demonstrated by means of some realistic simulations of urban traffic networks, including stochastic errors in the traffic demands and in the MFD model, in addition to cyberattacks.