Linebacker 2 - An Examination of Strategic Use of Airpower

Abstract : After a decade of fragmented and inconclusive political/military actions in Vietnam, Linebacker II was implemented on Dec 18, 1972 and strategic use of airpower became the military instrument designed to successfully terminate U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This study examines why it took almost ten years for decision-makers to decide on strategic use of airpower even though such action was first advocated by General Curtis Lemay at the 1964 Honolulu conference. This paper also provides an historical analysis of events that lead to Linebacker II and makes the following conclusions: (1) Misidentification of the enemy and his center of gravity prevented senior officials from adapting the Linebacker II strategy until it was the only option available. Although generally considered a success, Linebacker II contained tactical and operational defects which almost invalidated the concept of strategic airpower as a war- winning endeavor.