‘Those European Chicken Littles’: Reagan, NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2

This article focuses on transatlantic relations in the run-up to and aftermath of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. Through an analysis of British, US, German, and NATO sources, this article highlights the fundamental differences and consequent disagreements that occurred between the Reagan administration and its European allies in 1981–2. It argues that these divergences originated from economic considerations, from a fundamentally discrepant conception of detente on the two sides of the Atlantic, and from the Reagan administration's mismanagement of the crisis. Not only did Reagan disregard NATO's contingency plans dating from 1980 and did not consult the allies, he also designed US sanctions specifically to dash a joint agreement between the Europeans and the Soviet Union for the construction of a pipeline that was to deliver Siberian gas into Western Europe.