CAFS: a novel lightweight cache‐based scheme for large‐scale intrusion alert fusion

In this paper, we present some practical experiences on implementing an alert fusion mechanism from our project. After investigation on most of the existing alert fusion systems, we found the current body of work alternatively weighed down in the mire of insecure design or rarely deployed because of their complexity. As confirmed by our experimental analysis, unsuitable mechanisms could easily be submerged by an abundance of useless alerts. Even with the use of methods that achieve a high fusion rate and low false positives, attack is also possible. To find the solution, we carried out analysis on a series of alerts generated by well‐known datasets as well as realistic alerts from the Australian Honey‐Pot. One important finding is that one alert has more than an 85% chance of being fused in the following five alerts. Of particular importance is our design of a novel lightweight Cache‐based Alert Fusion Scheme, called CAFS. CAFS has the capacity to not only reduce the quantity of useless alerts generated by intrusion detection system, but also enhance the accuracy of alerts, therefore greatly reducing the cost of fusion processing. We also present reasonable and practical specifications for the target‐oriented fusion policy that provides a quality guarantee on alert fusion, and as a result seamlessly satisfies the process of successive correlation. Our experiments compared CAFS with traditional centralized fusion. The results showed that the CAFS easily attained the desired level of simple, counter‐escapable alert fusion design. Furthermore, as a lightweight scheme, CAFS can easily be deployed and excel in a large amount of alert fusions, which go towards improving the usability of system resources. To the best of our knowledge, our work is a practical exploration in addressing problems from the academic point of view. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.