AIDS Policy and Pharmaceutical Patents: Brazil's Strategy to Safeguard Public Health

HIS article examines the relationship between Brazil’s obligations as a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its drug pricing strategy for HIV/AIDS drugs. Brazil’s strategy has been controversial though successful, insofar as they have compelled the research-based pharmaceutical industry to lower pharmaceutical prices. This paper examines why the Brazilian strategy was effective and considers the wider implications for other developing countries dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis, pharmaceutical patent obligations and the need to provide cost-effective medicines for their populations. The paper is organised as follows. The context for the analysis is developed through a description of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in Section 2, and an examination of Brazil’s public health system and pharmaceutical sector in Section 3. The Brazilian AIDS Policy is considered in Section 4. A game-theoretic analysis of the Brazilian strategy is examined in Section 5. Brazil’s response to the TRIPS Agreement and its outcome are considered in Section 6. The implications for other developing countries are outlined in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.