Introduction: Exploring Epistemological Anarchism

Paul Karl Feyerabend has been considered as the worst enemy of science, an enfant terrible, and is generally considered to be the maximum exponent of epistemological anarchism (Theocaris & Psimopoulos, 1987). However, what it actually entails is difficult to understand and its meaning elusive. For example, in his famous Against Method (Feyerabend, 1975a) he provides counterexamples against standard methodological advice, such as: Do not allow theories in contradiction with observations, only allow theories that can be potentially falsified, generalize inductively from facts, maintain a clear difference and distinction between theories and facts, and metaphysical ideas need not have a central role in scientific theorizing. In other words in actual scientific practice such advice may not be followed, and this was Feyerabend’s major concern. No wonder, the New York Times headlined its obituary of Feyerabend as “Anti-science philosopher” (published March 8, 1994) and then continued to attribute the following:Interestingly, even philosophers of science hold similar views with respect to Feyerabend (e.g., Achinstein, 2004; Hattiangadi, 1977; Preston, 1997). The reference to objective truth is particularly important in this context. Before the publication of Einstein’s theory of relativity starting in 1905 and the development of quantum mechanics, many physicists also considered classical Newtonian mechanics to be objectively true, and this perspective started to change in the early twentieth century (cf. Giere, 2006a, 2006b). Similarly, it is generally considered that Feyerabend espoused guidelines such as: Scientists should not be constrained by the rules of the methodologist, fruitful violations of rules cannot be anticipated and legislated for in advance, and new practices will alter methodologies (Gower, 1997, pp. 246–247). The last advice is particularly important as it provides insight with respect to how science is actually done or practiced. Such descriptions of Feyerabend’s contributions (as an anti-science philosopher) to history and philosophy of science (HPS) are also fairly common in both science and science education. In contrast, Kadvany (2001) considers that such descriptions are not only false but also ignore the fact that Feyerabend had a great love and admiration for classical science (p. 151). Furthermore, Feyerabend was completely allied in his criticism of “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970) and its dangers with K. Popper and I. Lakatos. This is important as both Popper and Lakatos are generally considered to espouse rationalism in history and philosophy of science (HPS). Kadvany (2001) presents the following overall perspective: “Indeed, Feyerabend provided something of a critical doctrine of science’s role in society, arguing for a kind of libertarianism of ideas, adapting John Stuart Mill’s ideas on freedom from On Liberty to the proliferation of theories in science and knowledge generally” (p. 151).