Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti

Mandate and Advance Planning UNOSOM II was officially established by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993, four months after the U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF) had begun, and less than six weeks before UNOSOM II was to take over. Both operations were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter, but UNOSOM II was explicitly authorized to employ coercive force for a much broader mandate, covering more territory. Little planning had been done by the UN, and U.S. planning on behalf of the UN was not effectively integrated. Despite strong urging by the United States, no UN planners were sent to Somalia before the arrival of the UNOSOM II Commander and Deputy Commander in late March, 1993. Because of this lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement (ROE). Their staff consisted only of that assembled hastily for them by UNITAF from its component units which would stay for UNOSOM II and they received only weak support from the inexperienced, undermanned, and overworked UN Secretariat staff. (At this time the Secretary General's military advisor had a staff of only two officers. Two years later, by the time planning began for UNMIH, this office had expanded to over one hundred experienced officers). Given this background, it is not surprising that UNOSOM II encountered the difficulties it did. Preparations for Haiti were better. The U.S.-led Multi-National Force (MNF) and the follow-on UN-led UNMIH were established by UNSC Resolution 940 on July 31, 1994. The mandates were very similar. The UN Secretariat and the United States started planning for UNMIH shortly after its approval eight months before UNMIH was to take over. A 60-person UN planning team went to Haiti in October 1994 to work with the MNF, and experienced personnel of the UN Secretariat worked closely with U.S. planners from the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and the Joint Staff. There were numerous visits and interchanges of ideas between the U.S. and the UN, leading to a mutually approved transition plan and a subsequent plan for on-going UNMIH operations. This included an intensive two-week training session in early March for UNMIH staff. Politically, the experienced U.S. Ambassador provided continuity for the UN in understanding and dealing with the Haitians, working closely with both the MNF and the UNMIH. Support from the UN Secretariat after the transition, supplemented by USACOM, has been satisfactory. Thus, there was a more reasonable mandate for Haiti with more experienced and numerous planners preparing for UNMIH well in advance. Size and Composition of Forces; C3 For UNMIH, the force envisaged is 6,000 down from 20,000 in MNF including the 550-person U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in U.S. camouflage not UN white painted vehicles and helicopters. The retention of 550 U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Haiti's interior provides a significant stabilizing capability UNMIH would otherwise lack. Some 5,500 of the 6,000 personnel were present at the time of transition on March 31. The 12,000- person UNOSOM II force at the time of transition was too much reduced in size and capability (see table); the UNMIH force appears to be well-sized to the military requirements of Haiti. In Somalia, the United States and the UN badly misunderstood the size and composition of military force which UNOSOM II would need to maintain security, even before the mandate was explicitly modified on June 5, 1993 to include bringing Aideed's Somali National Army (SNA) to justice. The psychological impact of the May 4, 1993 departure of U.S. combat forces from South Mogadishu with their tanks and helicopters, and their replacement by Pakistanis without tanks emboldened Aideed. The Pakistani unit in his territory was weaker and it stopped the night patrolling and other aggressive tactics the U. …