Civil Affairs Organization in Haiti

After conducting his own mission analysis that encompassed implied as well as stated tasks, the battalion commander recommended that the CA force package include functional specialists in engineering, public health and public safety, as well as a French linguist His reasoning was that these specialists, working within MNF mission constraints. . . [would address] HCA needs and strengthen the Haitian population's confidence in the new democratic regime. ... With the exception of the linguist the GS was unable to support the request His decision was consistent with the strict mission parameters inherited from the lOth MD(L). IN JANUARY 1995, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [25th ID(L)] under the command of then Major General George Fisher, took control of the Multinational Force (MNF) conducting Operation Maintain Democracy in Haiti. Fisher took with him 70 soldiers from the 448th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, one of four generalpurpose battalions organized under the 364th CA Brigade, Portland, Oregon. Between June 1995 and March 1996, after transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), two other CA battalions, the 407th and 445th, also deployed to Haiti to conduct civil-military operations (CMO). This article tells how these battalions were organized and led during the Haiti deployment, tracing their evolution over a IS-month period from small, uncoordinated teams into an effective countrywide organization. We look at what worked well "on the ground" in Haiti, as well as what did not work so well and why. We then draw two conclusions relevant to CA doctrine: * CA forces are best deployed as units, commanded by a branch-qualified CA officer, who can be held accountable for executing the CA campaign plan throughout the operational area. * The CA commander should be "dual-hatted" to serve on the force commander's special staff, where he can best contribute expertise on CA issues and work with the force commander's coordinating staff officer (G5, J3/CA) on future CMO plans. This article's conclusions run "against the grain" of much recent discussion within the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, which has tended to regard the CA unit commander as an expendable commodity on operational deployments.1 We believe this trend is unwise and runs counter to three principles proven effective over the years in both war and operations other than war (OOTW): objective, unity of command and economy of force. This article, based on lessons learned from the Haiti deployment, provides evidence in support of this point of view. CA and the Multinational Mission in Haiti The 25th ID(L) inherited the US-led MNF from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [lOth MD(L)].2 This is significant because the mission and composition of the basic force package had already been determined. The MNF mission was "to maintain a stable and secure environment in which the Government of Haiti, with the support of international organizations and agencies, can return to functional governance."3 The clear emphasis was on enforcing law and establishing order. Once these criteria were satisfied, the MNF would turn the mission over to the UN, whose major task would be supervising the conduct of "free and fair elections." In keeping with this concept, humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects were assigned a subordinate role. There were no funds, such as those provided under Title 10 of the US Code, specifically designated for these purposes. Commanders could use their own limited operational funds to support HCA, but only when proposed projects involved something required by the stated mission, such as road improvements when the road served as a main supply route for deployed forces.' Similarly, under the concept of "opportune lift," US military aircraft would only accept passengers on a space-available basis from the numerous nongovernment and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVOs) that were in Haiti attempting to provide humanitarian relief and address longterm development issues. …