Low-complexity framework for GNSS jamming and spoofing detection on moving platforms

Performance of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) mounted on aerial platforms could be degraded by the presence of jamming or spoofing threats. Detection of jamming and spoofing is essential considering practical applications of satellite navigation in passenger aircrafts, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters and fighters. Different algorithms and methods have been proposed for detection of these threats; however, their usage has many limitations because of their demanding weight, size and computational complexity, when embedded on aerial systems. In this study, the authors develop a theoretical framework to detect the presence of the threat of UAVs. The idea is based on the fact that, due to the UAV motion, the samples of received signal power from a fixed threat and from a GNSS satellite have different empirical probability density functions. Moreover, by using two antennas (an omnidirectional and a down-tilted-directional), they introduce a new method to distinguish between aerial and ground-based threats. The proposed algorithms have a low-computational burden and can consider the fading loss as well. Simulation results show the superior performance of the proposed methods, in terms of detection and false alarm probability, compared to the existing methods.