Evolutionary games with self-questioning adaptive mechanism and the Ising model

A class of evolutionary games using a self-questioning strategy switching mechanism played in a population of connected agents is shown to behave as an Ising model Hamiltonian of spins connected in the same way. The payoff parameters combine to give the coupling between spins and an external magnetic field. The mapping covers the prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag hunt games in structured populations. A well-mixed system is used to illustrate the equivalence. In a chain of agents/spins, the mapping to Ising model leads to an exact solution to the games effortlessly. The accuracy of standard approximations on the games can then be quantified. The site approximation is found to show varied accuracies depending on the payoff parameters, and the link approximation is shown to give the exact result in a chain but not in a closed form. The mapping established here connects two research areas, with each having much to offer to the other.