The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes an Appropriate Education

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT A. Background B. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act C. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. D. 1997 Amendments to the Individual with Disabilities Education Act III. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY: THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING "APPROPRIATE" A. Facts and Procedural History B. The Supreme Court's Opinion IV. THE "EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY" STANDARD A. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence B. Justice White's Dissent V. POST-ROWLEY DECISIONS A. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16 B. Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education VI. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT: A CALL TO INCREASE THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING "APPROPRIATE" A. IEP Amendments B. Highly Qualified Teachers VII. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT VIII. THE ADOPTION OF A NEW SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD IX. FINANCIAL CONCERNS A. Past Financial Difficulties B. Resolutions to Solve Financial Difficulties X. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION Christopher, diagnosed at six years old with Asperger's Syndrome, (1) is a child with a disability. (2) Upon his diagnosis, Christopher's public school developed his Individualized Education Program (IEP) (3) to serve Christopher's educational needs; however, his needs went unmet. Throughout Christopher's four years at his public school, his parents repeatedly met with school officials about the appropriateness of services being offered to Christopher as his IEP did not account for the individualized class support Christopher required. (4) Despite consistent and dedicated efforts by his parents, school officials continually informed them there was nothing more the school or teachers could do. (5) Unwilling to risk their son's educational future and unsure they would be able to disprove the vague "meaningful educational benefit" substantive standard of review for an IEP, Christopher's parents assumed the costs of placing their child in a private school specializing in educating children with disabilities. (6) The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or the Act) identifies thirteen categories of disabilities that qualify children for its educational protections. (7) The Act was devised to provide children with qualifying disabilities a "free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." (8) Problematic, however, is IDEA's failure to define the term "appropriate." (9) Therefore, the United States Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley (10) defined "appropriate" by stating schools have met this substantive standard if an IEP confers "some educational benefit." (11) This definition, "conferring an educational benefit," (12) has purposely been left very broad as the courts have avoided establishing more stringent guidelines regarding the substantive aspect of an IEP. (13) The recent Reauthorization of the IDEA seeks to raise the bar regarding what constitutes an "appropriate" education. The Reauthorized IDEA, which became effective July 1, 2005 and entitled the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA), amended the IDEA and changed the established substantive guideline by emphasizing and outlining new provisions that must be present for an IEP to be deemed "appropriate" in addition to increasing training and qualifications of special educators. (14) These substantive provisions require courts to alter their interpretations of what is considered an "appropriate" education for students with disabilities. …