出行路径选择的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 Refined Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of Traveler Route Choice

本文研究在不完美信息下确定出行者路径选择行为的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。博弈双方之间的信息不透明成为决定最终路径选择的重要因素。将不完美信息下博弈双方路径选择过程视为不完全信息下的动态博弈过程，首先对出行者出行路径选择获得的收益进行分析，然后运用博弈树的知识，在不完全信息条件下确定动态博弈中的纳什均衡，进而确定纳什均衡是否为精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。 The paper researches the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium of determining traveler’s route choice behavior under imperfect information. The opaque information between two players becomes an important factor which decides the final path choice. Let the route choice process under the imperfect information be the dynamic game process under the incomplete information, first, we analyze the gains obtained in the traveler route choice, then by using the knowledge of the game tree, the Nash equilibrium in dynamic game is determined under the condition of incomplete information, and furthermore whether the Nash equilibrium is the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium is determined.