A Practical Scheme for Data Secure Transport in VoIP Conferencing

In the Multi-party VoIP conferencing system, it is important to provide properties of non-repudiation, unforgeable, and privacy. Previous work usually achieve these goals by using digital signature, TLS, IPsec, or other cryptographic tools. However, many approaches either compromise performance or lack of formal security proof, or both. In this work, we construct a practical Multi-party VoIP conferencing scheme based on the Boneh-Canetti-Halevi-Katz construction. Our work focus on the data secure transport stage, (i.e., we assume that the group session key is already distributed in the key distribution stage.). In comparison with previous work, our scheme gives a new paradigm for achieving properties of non-repudiation, unforgeable, and privacy simultaneously. The new paradigm avoids digital signature that have been shown time-consuming. On the other hand, our scheme is provable security. We prove the non-repudiation property in a formal way, and give proof sketches of unforgeable property and privacy property.