Conclusion: Towards an Overarching Framework for Biochemical Controls

The evidence from the life science laboratories is quite clear: there is going to be an increasing risk that new discoveries will facilitate both state-level offensive biological weapons programmes and sub-state (terrorist) development of biological weapons. For over a decade it has been clear that only a wide-ranging integrated web of policies will be adequate to prevent this misuse of our new scientific and technological capabilities taking place. The web of deterrence1 or web of prevention consists, at the very least, of: comprehensive, verifiable, global CB arms control to create a risk of detection and a climate of political unacceptability for CB weapons; broad export monitoring and controls to make it difficult and expensive for a proliferator to obtain necessary materials; effective CB defensive and protective measures to reduce the military utility of CB weapons; and a range of determined and effective national and international responses to CB acquisition and/or use.2