Logistics Command and Control (C2) and Its Application During Desert Shield/Storm

Abstract : With the integration of warfighting concepts from AirLand Battle, Future to AirLand Operations and their requirements for nonlinear battles with enduring sustainment imperatives anticipation, continuity, integration, responsiveness and improvisation, the future of our Army to project power on major regional contingencies depends even more on logistics as a combat multiplier. General Norman Schwarzkopf made this clear when, in the early stages of Desert Shield, he said 'once again the logistics tail wags the fighting dog'. Our logistics decisions today will affect combat capabilities tomorrow. Our emerging combat service support (CSS) doctrine, calling for a multifunctional Command and Control (C2) headquarters at the battalion and group level set the stage to correct earlier doctrine that seemed to lag behind our Warfighting Doctrine. Reviewing logistics lessons during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the outcome of the war bears out the fact that logistics never constrained a tactical or strategic commanders' decision. While true, such a statement may lead to the incorrect conclusion that our logistics support concept is adequate for the Army of the 21st Century. In fact, our ability to support the operation more accurately reflected the limited duration of the ground war than our logistics robustness. The corps support group concept of logistics C2 can support forces involved in regional contingencies, by creating sufficient flexibility to adapt to requirements that our country's military strategy demands. However, now that we are in a world of high technology, limited resources and face a downsizing force structure, we must continue to refine logistics C2 and a new methodology for deploying of CSS assets, that incorporate changes in technology and lessons from Desert Shield/Storm.